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Introduction
One need not think long to realize the extent of technological innovations
since 1934, the year Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act. The
advent of accessible, efficient, and inexpensive global communication sys-
tems has brought economic opportunities to even the most remote individ-
uals. Once impenetrable markets now seem ready to be exposed.
Electronic systems are the catalysts behind this new interconnectivity. In
the past, it was necessary to have a physical trading floor to effectuate stock
exchanges. This necessity has been obliterated in recent years with the suc-
cess of the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quota-
tions (NASDAQ)2 in the United States and the countless electronic
brokerage systems that have proliferated over the past two decades. One
analyst described it as a "siege," postulating that "the trading systems have
produced the greatest upheaval in the financial marketplace since the pres-
ent structure arose from the ashes of the Depression."'3 These new trading
systems are a cause of great concern among the traditional exchanges.
Even NASDAQ, which was intended to exemplify the modern exchange,
has been caught in a bind. Both NASDAQ and the NYSE have been losing
trades to alternative trading systems (ATS) or electronic communications
networks, as they are also known (ECN). 4 It is no easy feat for these insti-
tutions to convert to the ECN framework. To "build an ECN... you need
capital, and a self-regulated organization" such as NYSE and NASDAQ
"doesn't have an easy way to raise it and a corporation with stock does."5
Everyone involved in the markets realized that the potential for market
linkage and cross-border trading through ECNs is seemingly without
bounds. Nonetheless, U.S. market regulators continually have restrained
this burgeoning of global inter-relatedness due to fear of U.S. investors' vul-
nerability in comparatively unrestricted foreign markets. The Securities
2. NASDAQ is a
computerized quotation system operated by the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers, which acts as a self-regulatory organization for the [over-the-
counter] market. Inaugurated in 1971, NASDAQ displays continuously the
updated bids and offers of competing market makers on a real-time basis on
cathode-ray-tube screens located in subscribers' offices. The system enables
subscribers to see at a glance which market maker in any NASDAQ-quoted stock
is making the highest bid or the lowest offer. Thus, a brokerage firm with a
customer's order to buy a security would check its NASDAQ screen for the mar-
ket maker in that security making the lowest offer and then telephone or telex
that market maker in order to execute the trade. Beginning in 1985, small
orders in all NASDAQ-quoted stocks could be executed electronically over the
system.
NoRMAN S. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: LONDON'S "BIG BANG" AND THE
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKET 41 (1991).
3. Greg Ip, The Stock Exchanges, Long Static, Suddenly Are Roiled by Change, WALL
ST.J.,July 27, 1999, at Al. Richard Grasso, NYSE chief, observed: "I don't think there's
ever been a period like this in the history of the world capital markets." Id.
4. See Jesse Angelo, No Easy Answers to ECN Challenge, N.Y. PosT, July 27, 1999, at
41.
5. Id.
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and Exchange Commission (SEC) is concerned that exposure to foreign
stock exchanges will leave unsophisticated U.S. investors unprotected.
Though attempting to accommodate innovation, an inability to reach a
consensus regarding the means of regulating ATSs 6 has plagued the SEC.
Generally, the SEC has defined a trading system as "any system providing
for the dissemination outside the sponsor and its affiliates of indications of
interest, quotations, or orders7 to purchase or sell securities, and providing
procedures for executing or settling transactions in such securities." 8 ATSs
simply accomplish these activities through an electronic format in which
computers link buyers and sellers with matching quotes to effectuate
sales. 9 These computer systems are capable of reaching a larger number of
investors than traditional markets by conveying market information to a
broader group of players.' 0 This broad reach has contributed to the growth
of such systems.
There are several ATS variations, each affording a slightly different
benefit or format than the other. Some ATSs constitute an entire exchange
while others operate under a single-price auction format." Other ATSs are
cooperative branches of an existing traditional floor exchange, either pro-
viding another mechanism for trades or extending trading hours past the
6. "[Ajlternative trading systems (ATS) refers generally to 'automated systems that
centralize, display, match, cross, or otherwise execute trading interest, but that are not
currently registered with the Commission as national securities exchanges or operated
by a registered securities association.'" A. Jared Silverman, SEC Proposes Significant
Market Restructuring, W.ALLsTRErLAWYER.coM: SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE, Aug.
1997, at 6.
7. The SEC defines order as "any firm indication of a willingness to buy or sell a
security, as either principal or agent, including any bid or offer quotation, market order,
limit order, or other priced order." 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(c) (1999).
8. Ian Domowitz, An Exchange Is a Many-Splendored Thing: The Classification and
Regulation of Automated Trading Systems, in THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULA-
TION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 96 (Andrew W. Lo ed., 1996).
9: Ian Domowitz defines ATSs as "mathematical algorithms that enable trade
matching without the person-to-person contact afforded by traditional trading floors or
telephone networks." Id.
10. See id.
11. The National Securities Trading System (NSTS) of the Cincinnati Stock Exchange
serves as an example of an ATS which comprises "the entirety of an exchange's trading
operations," whereas the Arizona Stock Exchange is a single-price auction. Id. Basi-
cally, what occurs in a single-price auction format is as follows: participants enter limit
orders. Bids and offers are displayed in order books. Customers can then view these
orders on their screens and alter them until a specified cutoff time. Almost instantane-
ously after this cutoff time, the system reviews the orders. This review entails a process
of determining the most accurate price at which "the volume of buying interest is closest
to the volume of selling interest. That price will be the 'auction price.' Participants that
have [sic] entered bids at or above and offers at or below the auction price will be enti-
tled to execution at the auction price on the basis of time priority." Carl Landauer &
Elizabeth K. King, Technology and the Securities Market, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CoR-
PorATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SmES, PLI ORDER No. B4-7241, Oct. 1998,
at 474-75. Generally speaking, "Itihe U.S. exchange markets" historically have been
termed "'auction' markets, in the sense that all orders are channeled to one place, the
stock exchange floor, where there is a two-way auction to arrive at the best price avail-
able. Customers' buy-and-sell orders have an opportunity to meet without the interven-
tion of a professional dealer." Poser, supra note 2, at 39.
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customary activity day.12
These systems diverge not only from traditional regulatory classifica-
tions but also from each other. As a result, the historical statutory scheme
provides an unnatural fit when applied to ATSs. In the absence of an agree-
ment on how to classify ATSs for regulatory purposes, the majority of ATSs
have registered with the SEC as broker-dealers (BDs). 1 3 Some suggested
alternative means of regulation include registering ATSs as "registered
exchanges or facilities thereof, and exempt exchanges.' 4 An ATS can reg-
ister as an exchange by filing under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, whereas Section 5 of the Act provides a means by which enti-
ties can seek exemption from registration. 15 Another element added to the
debate over the method of regulating ATSs was a suggestion to reintroduce
rule 15c2-10. 16 This rule provides an additional regulatory classification
wedged logically between the broker-dealer category and the exchange cate-
gory, with requirements stemming from both traditional structures. 17
Instead, in December 1998, the SEC released its final rule on the regu-
lation of exchanges and ATSs, in which the Commission adopted new rules
12. Examples include: "Retail Automated Execution System (RAES) of the Chicago
Board Options Exchange, Scorex of the Pacific Stock Exchange, and the after-hours
crossing networks of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)." Domowitz, supra note 8, at
96.
13. See id. at 94; Silverman, supra note 6, at 6. See also Regulation of Exchanges and
Alternative Trading Systems,, SEC Release No. 34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70844, 70845
(Dec. 22, 1998) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 3440760]. "[Amny person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not
include a bank" is a broker. A dealer is
any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own
account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any
person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account, either individu-
ally or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as part of a regular business.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(4)-(5), 15 U.S.C. § 787c (1994). Instinet, "It]he
oldest and largest electronic network," is "[o]fficially registered as a broker-dealer .... "
This system "has enabled its big-money clients to trade over 170 million shares a day in
40 of the world's markets, as well as after the close of the U.S. exchanges." Bill Alpert,
Wall Street Revolution: Technology Is Toppling Trading's Berlin Wall, BARROW'S, July 26,
1999, at 19.
14. Domowitz, supra note 8, at 98.
A system may also be classified as a securities association, but such an associa-
tion (e.g., the National Association of Securities Dealers [NASD]) is subject to
very similar requirements as registered exchanges; see Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 15A(b)(1)-(8). Other categories include clearing agency, transfer
agent, and securities information processor. The first is not relevant, given the
emphasis on the process of trading rather than on the clearing of transactions.
The second involves issuance and registration of securities. The NASD has sug-
gested that a trading system be categorized as a securities information proces-
sor. Registration as such is not required unless the trading system is first
classified as an exchange or securities information processor that acts on an
exclusive basis on behalf of a self-regulatory organization. See Sections
3(a)(22)(B) and 11a(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act.
Id. at 98 n.14.
15. See id. at 99.
16. See id.
17. See id.
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and amended existing ones to "allow alternative trading systems to choose
whether to register as national securities exchanges, or to register as bro-
ker-dealers and comply with additional requirements under Regulation
ATS, 18 depending on their activities and trading volume."19 "Reg ATS," as
it is commonly known, took effect in 1999. Basically, it "allows alternative
trading systems to actually become stock exchanges, giving them many of
the benefits and responsibilities of the traditional exchanges."20 However,
despite this agreement as to domestic ATSs, the SEC failed at that time to
reach a consensus regarding U.S. investors' access to foreign markets via
ATSs and postponed addressing the issue.21
Though cross-border trading had been a topic of debate throughout
the regulatory colloquy, one entity added to the immediacy of the issue in
1998 and 1999. Tradepoint Financial Networks plc (Tradepoint),22 an
electronic exchange in the United Kingdom, applied for permission to oper-
ate "in" the United States and in March of 1999 attained it.2 3 It "asked the
18. Regulation ATS is the name which refers to the new market-oriented regulatory
scheme adopted pursuant to SEC Release No. 34-40760. This Regulation determines the
amount of regulation that is applied to a system according to a set of specifications. See
infra note 19.
19. SEC Release No. 34-40760, supra note 13, at 70844. Regulation ATS breaks
down its requirements into three levels. If a system has (A) "less than five percent of the
trading volume in all securities it trades" it "is required only to: (1) file with the Com-
mission a notice of operation and quarterly reports; (2) maintain records, including an
audit trail of transactions; and (3) refrain from using the words 'exchange,' 'stock mar-
ket,' or similar terms in its name." If however, the system has (B) "five percent or more of
the volume in national market system securities" it must "be linked with a registered
market in order to disseminate the best priced orders in those national market system
securities displayed in their systems (including institutional orders) into the public
quote stream." Finally, if a system has (C) "twenty percent or more of the trading vol-
ume in any single security, whether equity or debt" it "would be required to: (1) grant or
deny access based on objective standards established by the trading system and applied
in a non-discriminatory manner; and (2) establish procedures to ensure adequate sys-
tems capacity, integrity, and contingency planning." Id. at 70848.
20. Ip, supra note 3, at A10. While 10 years ago the United States had only nine
securities exchanges, some feel that due to Reg ATS, the United States "could theoreti-
cally have more than 20." This "[ailmost everyone agrees... would be too many." Id. A
corresponding increase in demand would not necessarily be present. See id. Similar
concerns have been voiced about allowing a low-volume exemption to ATSs - that it
may result in an unnecessary proliferation of exchanges. See infra note 167.
21. See SEC Release No. 34-40760, supra note 13, at 70846.
22. Founded by "former London Stock Exchange officials to rival the LSE," Trade-
point commenced operations in 1995. Chris Kentouris, NYSE Complains About Trade-
point's U.S. Expansion, SEcu~iuns INDusTRY Nhvs, Jan. 4, 1999, at 21.
23. The Commission believes that an exchange operated offshore but targeting
U.S. persons, which is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, through a
financial interest or otherwise, by a U.S. national securities exchange or
national securities association, would be considered a U.S. market operated by
an SRO. As such, it would be subject to Commission oversight. The Commis-
sion notes that Tradepoint, as a condition to this Order, has agreed that it is
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.
Tradepoint Financial Networks plc; Order Granting Limited Volume Exemption from
Registration as an Exchange Under Section 5 of the Securities Exchange Act, SEC
Release No. 34-41199, 64 Fed. Reg. 14953, 14956 n.30 (1999) [hereinafter SEC Release
No. 34-41199].
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SEC to allow U.S. broker-dealers and institutional investors to have access
to its trading system, but requested that it not have to register as a U.S.
exchange because it [is] a 'low-volume' exchange."2 4 Historically, such
direct trade access was barred by virtue of Section 30 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which makes it unlawful for "any broker or dealer,
directly or indirectly, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce for the purpose of effecting on an exchange
not within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States .... *"25 But,
because the SEC determined that "it is not practicable and not necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors to
require Tradepoint to register as a national securities exchange," the Com-
mission granted the application for exemption.2 6
Trading on the Tradepoint system will be effectuated through a screen-
based2 7 technology, creating a seamless market undisturbed by the Atlan-
tic. Tradepoint's application for an exemption as a limited volume
exchange sparked discussion not only as to whether it is prudent to allow
such direct access to a foreign market, but also as to whether classification
as an exchange is the best way for such a system to register in the United
States.2 8 This exchange title continues to raise concerns regarding the
proper nomenclature for such an entity. Similarly, the applicability of
traditional exchange registration requirements, the adequacy of protection
for investors, and the flexibility for future technological innovation have all
been called into question.29
This Note will argue that while the Application for the low volume
Section 5 exemption was wisely awarded by the SEC to open the door to
Tradepoint, this registration option is not adequate for the future. It con-
strains growth by rewarding Tradepoint's low volume nature and fails to
adapt to the improvements provided by the electronic system. Instead, the
SEC must regulate the access provider through a new set of requirements
24. Kentouris, supra note 22, at 21. The registration requirement is waived if "such
exchange.. . is exempted from such registration upon application by the exchange because,
in the opinion of the Commission, by reason of the limited volume of transactions effected on
such exchange, it is not practicable and not necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors to require such registration." Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1997) (emphasis added).
25. CmHnm.as H. MEYaa, THE SEcuRrnES ExcHANGE ACT OF 1934 ANALYZED AND
EXPLAiNED 148 (1994).
26. SEC Release No. 34-41199, supra note 23, at 14959.
27. A screen-based system is one which operates solely on computers - there is no
physical trading operation outside of the network. If it is permitted to operate in the
United States, the Tradepoint system will be run on Bloomberg machines "or through a
direct connection to the Exchange through an existing global private data network oper-
ator." SEC Release No. 34-41199, supra note 23, at 14955.
28. See Letter from Bloomberg L.P. to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (Aug. 28, 1998) (visited Sept. 21, 1998) <http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71298/ecclestl.html> [hereinafter Letter from Bloom-
berg] (discussing the reasons why exchange classification is not adequate).
29. See Notice of Application for Limited Value Exemption from Registration as an
Exchange Under Section 5 of the Securities Exchange Act, Release No. 34-40161, 63 Fed.
Reg. 37146, 37151-52 (July 9, 1998) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 34-40161].
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rather than attempting to fit systems such as Tradepoint into traditional
classifications for regulatory purposes. The Note will examine the regula-
tory options the SEC can implement to supervise not only Tradepoint, but
ATSs and ECNs in general.
Part I of the Note presents the background leading to Tradepoint's
application for a Section 5 exemption. It discusses the definition of an
exchange as well as the barriers that dissuaded foreign markets from
attempting to register in the United States in the past. It also addresses the
procedural regulations that historically have barred registration of foreign
markets, the objectives and Congressional intent behind these regulations,
and the possible need to alter existing guidelines to adapt to technological
advances. Part II discusses the options which existed for the registration of
Tradepoint. It examines the pros and cons, as well as the applicability of
each regulatory means, in light of the procedural evolutions of the techno-
logical era. It also analyzes alternative proposals championed by individu-
als and firms in the field who have an interest in the SEC's decisions. Part
III sets forth the proposition that while the Application's approval under
the Section 5 exemption was the best course at this time, it should only be
temporary in nature. This section details the unique characteristics of the
system. It discusses what makes Tradepoint a desirable addition to the U.S.
market and what contributed to the Application's success. The section
argues that the SEC must create a new means of registration for Trade-
point, which can then be utilized by subsequent foreign and domestic sys-
tems. Part IV examines the future impact the SEC's decision will have on
the registration of all ATSs, as well as the possibility of a proliferation of
privately owned electronic exchanges, both foreign and domestic.
I. Tradepoint Applies for Registration as a Limited Volume Exchange
On November 20, 1997, Tradepoint filed an application with the SEC, seek-
ing an exemption under Section 5 of the 1934 Act in order to avoid the
requirements of registration as a national securities exchange.30 In doing
so, Tradepoint sought to gain SEC approval to register as a limited volume
exchange, becoming the first non-U.S. securities exchange to commence
activity "within" the United States. 31 As a recognized Investment Exchange
under Section 37(3) of the U.K. Financial Services Act 1986 and a Regu-
lated Market under the European Investment Services Act, Tradepoint
launched its operations in the United Kingdom in 1995.32 Since then, it
30. See id. at 37147. Generally, an exchange must register under §§ 6 and 19(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order to become a national exchange. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Correlator, CCH cl 15,511.
31. See Tradepoint Receives SEC Approval to Apply For Exemption from Registering as a
U.S. Exchange, SEcuiurEs WEEK, July 6, 1998, at 4.
32. See Michael Dabaie, Tradepoint to Advertise Orders Over Autex, AmEmcAN BANEa,
INc., Sept. 28, 1998, at 31; see also Roger D. Blanc, Broker Dealer Regulation: 13 Letters
Regarding SEC File No. S7-16-97, ALI-ABA CouRsE OF STUDY MATrRaus, 36, n.1 (Jan. 8,
1998); Laurence James, Securities Law in the United Kingdom, in INTERNAION a SEcuRI-
Ties LAw HANDBOOK 209, 212 (Karl-Eduard von der Heydt, Stanley Keller eds., 1995)
(explaining that "[t]he UK's securities markets are regulated by the Financial Services
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has provided investors with an alternative to the London Stock Exchange
(LSE). 33
Tradepoint functions as a screen-based, electronic order market.
Unlike other exchanges, Tradepoint does not list securities. Instead, it
facilitates trading of LSE securities. 34 However, Tradepoint's management
believes that the enterprise can develop into a far more expansive electronic
market, hopefully dealing in U.S. and foreign securities in the future. 35 In
the United States, Tradepoint seeks to offer a public market for registered
securities and a separate, Qualified Institutional Buyer 36 market which
would offer unregistered securities. 37 At present, the functions Tradepoint
provides are largely inclusive. According to the narrative the SEC articu-
lated in its Release No. 34-40161, Tradepoint:
provides to its Members 38 an electronic, order-driven 39 market that handles
order entry and management, information display, matching, execution, and
Act 1986. With its enactment, most of the statutory powers under the Act were trans-
ferred from the Secretary of State to the Securities Investment Board (SIB), an agency
specifically created for this purpose."). The 1986 Act lays out the structure of regulation
for securities and commodities in Britain. See Roger D. Huang & Hans R. Stoll, Major
World Equity Markets: Current Structure and Prospects for Change, MONOGRAPH SERES IN
FINANCE AND EcoNoMIcs, Monograph 1991-3, 4 (1991).
33. Though commonly known as the London Stock Exchange, the formal name for
the market is the International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic
of Ireland Limited. See James, supra note 32, at 209.
34. See SEC Release No. 34-40161, supra note 29, at 37147. Presently, Tradepoint
"offers dealing in almost all of the shares in the FT All-Share index." CeriJones, Absolute
Beginners: When the best price isn't so good - This week, Beginners explains why the price at
which your broker executes share deals isn't necessarily the best available, INVESTORS CHRON-
IcLE, Dec. 11, 1998, at 39. Presently, the system "allows trading in around 2,000 listed
UK equities." SEC Approves Tradepoint to Enter U.S. (Mar. 23, 1999) <http://
www.tradepoint.co.uk/pr990323.html>.
35. See Tradepoint Financial Network PLC, Audited Results for the Year Ended 31
March 1998, CANADA NEwsWIRE, June 25, 1998.
36. Under Rule 144A of the Securities Exchange Act, a "qualified institutional buyer"
is defined as: "(i) Any of the following entities, acting for its own account or the
accounts of other qualified institutional buyers, that in the aggregate owns and invests
on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers that are not affili-
ated with the entity." See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a) (1998). In brief, these include: any
insurance company; any investment company or any business development company;
any small business investment company; any plan established and maintained by a state
or its political subdivisions for the benefit of its employees; any trust fund whose trustee
is a bank or trust company; any business development company; any organization
described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code; any investment adviser;
any dealer acting for its own account or the accounts of other QIBs, that own at least
$10 million; any dealer acting in a riskless principal transaction on behalf of a QIB; any
investment company acting for its own account or account of QIBs; any entity, all of
which the equity holders are QIBs, acting for its own account or account of other QIBs;
any bank, savings and loan association, foreign bank or savings and loan or its
equivalent, etc. See id.
37. See Kentouris, supra note 22, at 21.
38. Unlike members of other exchanges, membership in Tradepoint solely entitles
one to the right to trade on the system. It does not give one voting rights. See SEC
Release No. 34-40161, supra note 29, at 37147. "Potential Members," who are market-
makers, broker-dealers and institutional investors "must meet the eligibility require-
ments of the Exchange." SEC Release No. 34-41199, supra note 23, at 14954. Currently,
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immediate trade publication and settlement message routing.40 Members
are able to access the current market position in any security traded on the
Exchange; monitor selected market information provided by the Exchange in
real time; enter or revise orders; send orders to the relevant instant auction
and/or periodic auction books for execution ... set up, access, and request
trading and market reports; and input settlement routing instructions.
4 1
Additionally,
[m]embers of the Exchange are also able to enter 'cross trades.' Cross trades
between two customers of the same firm at a price between the bid and
offer. To effect a cross trade, a Member will simultaneously enter a bid and
an offer for a security, which will match after exposure to the electronic
order book.4 2
Under Tradepoint's recent Section 5 approval, U.S. Members will be
able to join the exchange in a manner similar to that of its current mem-
bers. However, because of the unique U.S. securities laws, "the Exchange
will offer two different levels of service - one for all U.S. Members ('Public
Markets') and one limited to U.S. Members who are 'qualified institutional
buyers' ('QIBs') as defined in Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933
.... "43 Also, as part of the arrangement, the system "has agreed to amend
its market rules and member agreement to include provisions that
expressly preserve a U.S. Member's anti-fraud protections under the federal
securities laws."4 4
there are "more than 80 members .... " SEC Approves Tradepoint to Enter U.S., supra
note 34.
39. Traditionally, "order-driven" markets are ones in which a specialist, "an
exchange member who is permitted to act both as broker on behalf of customers and as
a dealer in his own account, responds to orders and seeks to match buyers and sellers."
Such a system differs from a "quotation-driven" system within a "dealer" market. In a
dealer market,
virtually every trade goes through a professional dealer, or market maker, who
continually publishes bids and offers in the securities in which she is registered.
While trades are executed not in a central location but by telephone or telex
between the offices of brokers and dealers, prices are established through com-
petition among market makers. The over-the-counter market has been called a
'quotation-driven' system, in that investors respond to prices quoted by market
makers.
Poser, supra note 2, at 39-40.
40. The SEC recently added "for certain securities listed on the LSE" to its descrip-
tion after the word "routing." SEC Release No. 34-41199, supra note 23, at 14954.
41. SEC Release No. 34-40161, supra note 29, at 37197. In addition, "[t]he mini-
mum display size for any order is 1,000 shares. The Exchange does not provide a facility
for 'reserve' orders.., and is completely anonymous." SEC Release No. 34-41199, supra
note 23, at 14954.
42. SEC Release No. 34-41199, supra note 23, at 14954.
43. Id.
44. Id. This includes provisions which cover disputes.
[A] court or tribunal with jurisdiction over any dispute arising out of or in con-
nection with a transaction made on the Exchange shall apply the U.S. federal
securities law statutes to any cause of action based upon fraudulent acts or
omissions that either (a) occurred in the United States or (b) resulted in dam-
ages suffered in the United States.
SEC Release No. 34-41199, supra note 23, at 14958. It is also interesting that
"[a]lIthough the Exchange's market rules and member agreement require members to
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Coming in the wake of the SEC's Concept Release on Exchange Regu-
lation,45 which focused primarily on the coordination of ATSs, Trade-
point's application fueled the debate over the regulation of electronic
systems. With the Release in 1997, the SEC sought commentary on the
manner in which it should regulate ATSs. Recognizing the unique and new
characteristics of these systems, the SEC wished to react to these innova-
tions in an appropriate manner.4 6 The SEC imparted various regulatory
proposals such as classification of ATSs as BDs4 7 and the regulation of the
access provider itself. Yet, Tradepoint's filing as a low volume exchange
seemingly circumvented the controversy by taking advantage of an option
not available to other foreign exchanges. 48
A. What is an Exchange in Regulatory Terms?
Tradepoint's application elicited its own SEC release and subsequent com-
ment period. At the root of this discussion was the simple, but not easily
answered, question of what is an exchange. Traditionally, the definition in
the 1934 Act served as the standard.4 9 It states that an exchange is:
[a]ny organization, association, or group of persons.., which constitutes,
maintains, or provides a market place of facilities for bringing together pur-
chasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to
arbitrate their disputes in England, the Commission believes and expects that English
arbitrators and courts will follow the above requirements and interpret and apply the
U.S. federal securities laws as defined above." Id.
45. Regulation of Exchanges, SEC Release No. 34-38672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30485 (1997)
[hereinafter SEC Release No. 334-38672]. This release was an extension of SEC Release
No. 39885 that "explor[ed] ways to respond to the rapid technological developments
affecting securities markets and, in particular, the growing significance of alternative
trading systems." SEC Release No. 34-40760, supra note 13, at 70845.
46. An appropriate manner will provide the traditional protections investors have
come to expect, while also allowing innovation and growth. Some question the sincerity
of this aim. SEC Release No. 34-40760, supra note 13, at 70846. The Commission
encapsulated its aim in its final ruling on ATS regulation: "[T]he Securities and
Exchange Commission is adopting a regulatory framework for alternative trading sys-
tems, to strengthen the public markets for securities, while encouraging innovative new
markets." Id. at 70845. It later continued:
The Commission believes that its regulation of markets should both accommo-
date traditional market structures and provide sufficient flexibility to ensure
that new markets promote fairness, efficiency, and transparency. In adopting a
new regulatory framework for alternative trading systems today, the Commis-
sion has incorporated suggestions and responded to requests for clarification
made by commenters. The Commission believes that this regulatory approach
effectively addresses commenters' concerns while carefully tailoring a regula-
tory framework that is flexible enough to accommodate the evolving technology
of, and benefits provided by, alternative trading systems.
Id. at 70846. In summary, the SEC that the "regulatory framework" they wish to estab-
lish, "should encourage market innovation while ensuring basic investor protections."
Id.
47. See supra note 13 for definitions of the terms broker and dealer.
48. See Greg Ip, Upstart British Stock Exchange Seeks SEC Permission to Operate in the
U.S., WALL ST. J., July 2, 1998, at A6.
49. See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative
Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective (last modified Oct. 7, 1997) <http://
www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71697/oharal .htm>.
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securities and the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as
that term is generally understood, and includes the market place and the
market facilities maintained by such an exchange.5 0
Today, the SEC's definition of an exchange changed to a more funda-
mental one to include "only those entities that enhance liquidity in tradi-
tional ways through market makers, specialists, or single price auction
structure." 5' This definition proved troublesome for Tradepoint since it
operates without either market makers or specialists. 52 Allowing Trade-
point to register under a fictitious label would expose the inherent conflict
in the current definition without resolving the ultimate issue of how to
regulate electronic systems. Anticipating this conflict, the 1997 SEC
Release proposed to register an ATS as an exchange, where an exchange is
"an organization that both (a) consolidates orders of multiple parties, and
(b) provides a facility through which, or sets material conditions under
which, participants entering such orders may agree to the terms of a
trade."53
In December 1998, the SEC published its latest regulation, Rule 3b-16,
which once again altered the meaning of "exchange" under Section 3(a)(1)
of the Exchange Act. Now, an exchange "(1) [b]rings together the orders of
multiple buyers and sellers; and (2) uses established, non-discretionary
methods (whether by providing a trading facility or by setting rules) under
which such orders interact with each other, and the buyers and sellers
entering such orders agree to the terms of a trade."54 It appeared that
Tradepoint fell within the confines of the new definition.
B. Historic and Continuing Barriers to Registration as an Exchange
In the past, many obstacles dissuaded foreign exchanges from pursuing
registration in the United States. Computers have eliminated some of the
obstacles, but many remain.5 5 Regulatory barriers create the chief prob-
lem for most foreign exchanges. As Stephen Wilson of Tradepoint
observed, the London or Paris stock exchange could not use the limited
volume exemption "because by defiriition you can't be a low volume
exchange and be the dominant player in the market."5 6 However, newcom-
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (1999).
51. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49. In addition to providing liquidity, "exchanges
offer monitoring of exchange trading, standard form, off-the-rack rules to reduce trans-
action costs for investors, and a signaling function that serves to inform investors that
the issuing companies' stock is of high quality." Id.
52. See EdwardJ. Rosen, Developments, in SWAPs AND OTHE DRIuvAT.IVs IN 1997, at
1017 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7212, 1997).
53. Blanc, supra note 32, at 28.
54. SEC Release No. 34-40760, supra note 13, at 70847. The SEC explains that
"Rule 3b-16 explicitly excludes those systems that the Commission believes perform
only traditional broker-dealer activities." Id. Therefore, if a system only routes orders,
operates the bids and offers of merely one market maker or offers a forum for an individ-
ual to place orders against a single dealer, it is not included in Rule 3b-16's definition of
an exchange. See id.
55. See Ip, supra note 48, at A6.
56. Id.
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ers such as Tradepoint may use the exception for registration.5 7 In addi-
tion, economic considerations posed a formidable impediment to foreign
exchanges in the past. Before recent electronic innovations, a foreign
exchange would have had to provide and operate a physical trading floor in
the United States - a feat that could not be accomplished cost-effectively
from abroad. The exterisive regulation of exchanges by the SEC created
another hurdle. In order to register as an exchange without a Section 5
exemption, a prospective exchange must navigate through an arduous
series of obstacles.58 This process continues to be unfeasible for most for-
eign exchanges.
C. Regulatory Objectives
Why must we have such regulation if it encumbers registration and reduces
direct access to foreign securities by U.S. investors? Jonathan R. Macey and
Maureen O'Hara offer three reasons why regulation is necessary. First, the
authors point to "the problem of incomplete contracts."5 9 As they explain,
the cost of contracting is expensive. Securities laws lessen this cost and
allow market participants to engage in transactions "for free" 60 since the
laws provide standard contractual terms.6 1 Second, regulation facilitates
57. While a foreign exchange has never employed this tactic, the U.S. Arizona Stock
Exchange has. The Arizona Stock Exchange (AZX) is
a fully automated single-price auction market that facilitates secondary trading
of certain registered equity securities by broker-dealers and institutional partici-
pants. It is the only stock exchange currently operating under a limited volume
exemption from exchange registration. AZX participants enter limit orders
through terminals in their offices. Bids and offers are displayed in the order
books, which participants can view on their screens. Prior to a preestablished
cut-off time, participants may replace or cancel orders. Within seconds after the
auction cutoff time, the system reviews all orders with respect to each security
and determines the price at which the volume of buying interest is closest to the
volume of selling interest. That price will be the 'auction price.' Participants
that have entered bids at or above and offers at or below the auction price will
be entitled to execution at the auction price on the basis of time priority. Orders
matched in the auction are executed by a registered broker-dealer pursuant to a
contract with AZX. AZX operates two after-hours auctions and recently
obtained Commission approval to operate a single auction during regular trad-
ing hours. AZX also allows participants to enter pre-matched orders into its
system; these orders are then routed directly for auction.
Landauer & King, supra note 11, at 474-75. In granting the AZX its low-volume exemp-
tion, "the Commission used the volume levels of the fully regulated national securities
exchanges at that time as the benchmark for low volume for AZX." SEC Release No. 34-
41199, supra note 23, at 14956.
58. See Letter from Bloomberg, supra note 28, at 2. Bloomberg has a direct stake in
this regulatory debate since "[o]utside the United States, Bloomberg provides to institu-
tional customers and others the ability over the BLOOMBERG service to trade on Trade-
point Investment Exchange." Id. If Tradepoint received approval by the SEC, U.S.
investors could only access Tradepoint via Bloomberg terminals, though the possibility
remains that in the future others may be able to provide such access. See SEC Release
No. 34-40161, supra note 29, at 37147.
59. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49.
60. Id. "For free" means that no negotiation costs are incurred as a standard con-
tract already exists.
61. See id.
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enforcement mainly through surveillance of the market.62 This is neces-
sary in order to minimize fraud and manipulation.63 Third, the authors
assert that regulation protects third parties from the "externalities" that
result from the two contracting parties. 64 Despite the general justification
for regulation, it remains unclear whether ATSs provide additional reasons
for increased regulation.65
Congress' intent behind Section 11(a)66 of the 1934 Act was the "cen-
tralization of all buying and selling interest so that each investor has the
opportunity for the best possible execution of his or her order, regardless
of where the investor places the order."67 Congress established the SEC
mainly to regulate market transactions and to prevent manipulation and
excessive speculation which could cause national emergencies. 68 It has
charged the Commission to pursue efficiency, fair competition, trans-
62. See id.
63. See id. Minimizing fraud and manipulation of the market is among the SEC's
outlined goals as mandated by Congress, which specifically requires fairness and trans-
parency. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 addresses manipulation in two different
sections. Section 9 is the Prohibition Against Manipulation of Security Prices, while § 10,
the best known of the manipulation and fraud provisions, is termed Regulation of the Use
of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices. Section 10 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange - (a) To effect a short sale, or to use or
employ any stop-loss order in connection with the purchase or sale, of any
security registered on a national exchange, in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors. (b) To use or employ, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securi-
ties exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1997).
64. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49.
65. See id. Technology has afforded the SEC a better ability to monitor trading.
However, in the SEC's final ruling regarding regulation of ATSs, the Commission dis-
cussed its concerns as to why ATSs do present unique justifications for additional regu-
lation. Focusing mainly on the private versus public formation of ATSs, the SEC is
concerned over the formation of a private market that
developed only because the activity on alternative trading systems is not fully
disclosed, or accessible to public investors. Moreover, these trading systems
have no obligation to provide investors a fair opportunity to participate in their
systems or to treat their participants fairly. These systems may also not be ade-
quately surveilled for market manipulation and fraud .... In addition, alterna-
tive trading systems have no obligation to ensure that their systems are sufficient
to handle rapid increases in trading volume as occurs in times of market volatil-
ity, and at times they have failed to do so.
SEC Release No. 34-40760, supra note 13, at 70845.
66. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11(a), Regulated or Prohibited Trading by
Members, CCH c 22,801.
67. Letter from Bloomberg, supra note 28, at 7.
68. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Correlator, supra note 30, CCH 1 15,511.
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parency, access to the best prices, and an opportunity for investors to exe-
cute orders without a dealer.69 Tradepoint meets with these goals.
By creating an alternative to buying and selling through the LSE, inves-
tors will reap the benefits of this newly established competitive market.70
Already, "[a]nalysis shows that 86% of buyers and 82% of sellers beat the
LSE spread."'7 1 The LSE will be forced to improve its services to fend off its
adversaries, and costs should drop since the LSE will no longer be a
monopoly. With the additional flexibility gained by the Commission since
1996, Tradepoint's entry did not appear to pose a conflict of interest. 72 If
the aim of regulation is to achieve the best opportunities for investors and
reach the SEC's five stated pursuits, then Tradepoint specifically and ATSs
generally seem to require no additional regulation.
The 1997 SEC Release regarding ATSs elicited similar concerns as
those evoked by the Tradepoint Release. Still, the service Tradepoint pro-
vides appears to be consonant with the Commission's objectives listed
above. One commentator applauded "[t]he linking of all markets for quali-
fying securities through communication and data processing facilities" as
it would "foster efficiency, enhance competition, increase the information
available to brokers, dealers, and investors, facilitate the offsetting of inves-
tors' orders, and contribute to best execution of such orders. '73 Tradepoint
69. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49.
70. 1 believe there are also wider advantages to be gained from the existence of
competition between exchanges and trading mechanisms in encouraging a bet-
ter service for customers, particularly in the context of the dominating market
share in the trading of U.K. equities held by the LSE. These are advantages
which the SEC has recognized in its policy making in the domestic U.S. market.
Letter from Anthony Neuberger, Institute of Finance and Accounting, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary of the Securities and Exchange Commission (July 9, 1998) <http://
www.sec.gov/rules/other/f10-101/neuberg2.text> [hereinafter Letter from Neuberger].
See also Jeremy J. Siegel, Manager's Journal: The SEC Prepares for a New World of Stock
Trading, WALL ST. J., Sept 27, 1999, at A34:
If the SEC mandated this centralization of order-flow, competition would signifi-
candy enhance investor choice and the quality of the trading environment. 'If
barriers to competition did not exist, then neither would the need, in many
respects, for regulatory involvement,' said Mr. Levitt - a remarkable statement
from a man who heads a regulatory agency.
Id.
71. Chris Gregory, Comments: Tradepoint: Unique Service in the USA (Apr. 1999)
<http://www.tradepoint.co.uk/newslet~apr99_3.html>. For example, "[olne Member
saw total price improvement over the prevailing LSE best bid/ask of over £46,000." Id.
72. In 1996, Congress provided the Commission with greater flexibility to regu-
late new trading systems by giving the Commission broad authority to exempt
any person from any of the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ... and impose appropriate conditions on their operation. This new
exemptive authority, combined with the ability to facilitate a national market
system, provides the Commission with the tools it needs to adopt a regulatory
framework that addresses its concerns about alternative trading systems without
jeopardizing the commercial viability of these markets.
SEC Release No. 34-40760, supra note 13, at 70846.
73. Letter from Larry E. Fondren, President, Integrated Bond Exchange, Inc., to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the Securities and Exchange Commission (July 28, 1998)
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71298/fondren1.htm> [hereinafter Letter from
Fondren].
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provides a step in this direction. Though the LSE has been able to operate
without competition for decades, innovation will force it to improve its
services. This is desirable because "competing market centers should be
able to compete for participants and order flow on the basis of cost, service
and innovation."'74
The concerns regarding Tradepoint have been twofold. There is con-
cern regarding Tradepoint's similarity to ATSs 75 and apprehension about
exposing U.S. investors to foreign markets. 76 The latter concern continues
to be the strongest. In SEC Release 34-38672, the SEC expressed concern
that the discrepancies between U.S. and foreign regulations may "have the
potential to mislead U.S. investors that have come to rely on U.S. securities
laws."77 At the time of this Release, registration of ATSs as exchanges was
an unpopular option. Instead, the main proposal was to police the access
provider.78 This general form of supervision could itself take various
forms. If the ATS were to engage in brokerage activity, it could register as a
BD but could comply with the disclosure requirements of a Securities Infor-
mation Processor (SIP). 7 9 If it did not participate in traditional broker-
dealer activities, it could merely register as a SIP.80 The SEC believed that
both of these classifications provided the desired and necessary protec-
tions investors investing in foreign securities required.81
Most of the alternatives suggested for regulating foreign market activ-
ity, and, more specifically, the activity of Tradepoint, were unsuitable.
Because all of the traditional BD requirements were not necessarily applica-
ble to an electronic system, an amended procedure would have to be
adopted. From an administrative point of view, such a procedure is taxing
as each entity would tailor exactly how they classify their activities for the
purpose of circumventing certain requirements. However, prior to the
Tradepoint approval, a "functional" approach had evolved into the SEC's
favored method of regulating domestic ATSs. Using entities' activities and
trading volume as the benchmarks for registration, domestic ATSs could be
classified as either broker-dealers or exchanges.82 Regulation ATS83 is at
74. Blanc, supra note 32, at 26.
75. Insecurity due to the concern regarding this similarity is evidenced by SEC
Release No. 34-38672, supra note 45.
76. See id. at 12.
77. Sam Scott Miller et al., Tethering Technology: The SEC's Market Structure Concept,
INSIGHTS 10 (Sept. 1997).
78. See SEC Release No. 34-38672, supra note 45, at 30987.
79. See id.; see also Miller, supra note 77, at 10. A SIP is a Securities Information
Processors under § 11A of the Securities Exchange Act.
80. However, some feel registration as a SIP would just apply a new set of regulatory
burdens on ATSs that may discourage innovation and would not necessarily eliminate
the problems cross-border trading may create. See Miller, supra note 77, at 10.
81. See SEC Release No. 34-38672, supra note 45, at 30488 (discussing "adequate
protections to U.S. investors trading on foreign markets .... ").
82. See SEC Release No. 34-40760, supra note 13, at 70844.
83. This is the name given to the SEC's functional approach. See notes 18-20 and
accompanying text.
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the heart of this change and its vulnerability to manipulation seems
apparent.
II. Regulatory Options and Regulation ATS
The five suggested regulatory classifications of ATSs are: (1) broker-dealer,
(2) exchange, (3) exempt-exchange, (4) access provider, or (5) unregulated
entity.84 The SEC classified Tradepoint as an exempt-exchange but this
should solely be seen as a temporary measure. While Tradepoint currently
fulfills the low-volume criteria, this has the potential to change over time
and the SEC should not oppose such a development. The "functional"
approach the SEC extended to domestic ATSs, using activities only as deter-
minants as to whether any entity should be regulated as a BD or an
exchange, is not a sufficient solution to the regulatory dilemma Tradepoint
presents. Nor is the SEC's low volume exemption a sufficient solution.
The former contrives to force new electronic entities such as Tradepoint
into dated pigeonholes, while the latter punishes growth by using volume
as a criteria for whether an ATS must undergo the lengthy and cumber-
some procedure of registering as an exchange. Furthermore, by postpon-
ing a ruling on U.S. investors' access to foreign securities via ATSs, and by
approving the Tradepoint Application without a broader statement regard-
ing foreign ATSs, the SEC revealed its hesitancy as to the broad application
of its functional regulatory approach. A new access provider registration
procedure must be established in order to allow for innovation and cross-
border growth. To understand why a new classification is necessary, a
description of the various alternatives follows.
A. Registration as an Exchange
In order to obtain exchange status, an entity must register under Section 6
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.85 This procedure is relatively com-
plicated as compared to registration as a BD. 86 While Section 5 of the Act
provides an exemption for entities subject to Section 6's registration
84. Oddly, according to Benn Steil, Director of the International Economics Pro-
gramme, "[a]ll natural economic distinctions between stock exchanges and broker-deal-
ers have broken down .... Exchanges and brokers are now doing exactly the same
thing." Additionally, "Steil expects America's big stock markets to follow the lead of the
Stockholm and Sydney exchanges, where the silent screen has replaced the open outcry."
Alpert, supra note 13, at 19.
85. See Domowitz, supra note 8, at 98.
86. See id.
The first step in the registration of an exchange is the filing by the exchange with
the Securities and Exchange Commission of a registration statement. This regis-
tration statement must be in the form prescribed by the Commission and must
contain: (1) An agreement by the exchange to comply with the Act and enforce
compliance by its members, which is discussed in greater detail below. (2) Data
as to the exchange's organization, rules of procedure and membership, and
other information which the Commission may require. (3) Copies of its consti-
tution, articles of incorporation, by-laws, rules, etc., and (4) An agreement to
furnish the Commission with all amendments to the documents referred to in
paragraph (3).
Vol. 33
2000 Regulation of ECNs
requirements due to their low volume status, these vehicles are still consid-
ered "exchanges." The applicability of this exemption to Tradepoint and
similar ATSs is a primary cause of concern. Berm Steil, Director of the
International Economics Programme, argues that a decision by the SEC to
permit Tradepoint to register as an exempt exchange, despite its continued
bar on foreign exchanges registering under Section 6, would be "fundamen-
tally flawed" since "there is no basis for the underlying assumption that
U.S. investors are better protected when trading on a less liquid trading
system than they would be trading on a more liquid one."87 Less liquidity
does not ensure a safer environment for investors.88
Furthermore, one can argue that the low-volume exemption does not
create a solid precedent for future foreign electronic system candidates
because it only applies to small exchanges89 and is vague even within its
own narrow application.90 This is because Section 5 fails to articulate a set
criterion to determine what constitutes "limited volume."9 1 The SEC has
attempted to address this failure by proposing certain guidelines by which
Tradepoint's volume would be measured.92 Resulting from the difference
in share price and volume between the U.S. and U.K. markets, the Commis-
sion recognizes that Tradepoint's average daily volume in London may not
reflect the numbers it would reach in the United States. Therefore, the SEC
has proposed to use "dollar value as a benchmark for volume, rather than
average daily number of shares traded" since that will "more appropriately
Meyer, supra note 25, at 44.
For a complete description of Section 6's requirements, see Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) 1997).
87. Letter from Benn Steil, Director of International Economics Programme, The
Royal Institute of International Affairs, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (July 16, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/flo-101/
steill.html> [hereinafter Letter from Steil]. While unaffiliated with Tradepoint at the
time the letter was written, Mr Steil recently was "appointed as a non-executive director"
of Tradepoint, taking effect as of March 9, 2000. Tradepoint Financial - Re Directorate,
REG. Nhws SEmv., Mar. 9, 2000, available in 2000 WL 16609628.
88. Many feel the world's most liquid market, the U.S. government bond market, is
also the world's safest. See Rich Miller & Beth Belton, Dow Soars on Rate Cut Fed Psychol-
ogy: Prevent Havoc of Lost Confidence, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 1998, at lB.
89. Other foreign markets would be unable to copy this means of entering the U.S.
system. See Ip, supra note 48, at A6.
90. According to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 5, the exemption applies to
exchanges of limited-volume, but it remains unclear as to which exchanges can qualify
as such.
91. The guideline which was used to determine whether the Cincinnati Stock
Exchange constituted a low volume exchange was "the volume of the smallest of the fully
regulated national exchanges." Domowitz, supra note 8, at 99. This exchange averaged
717 trades per day with a daily share volume of 1,238,241 in 1990. See id. at 99 n.20.
92. See SEC Release No. 34-40161, supra note 29, at 37148-49. When discussing the
"Exemption Standards" for Tradepoint, the SEC noted that the Exchange is a low-volume
market in the U.K. since its volume was "significantly less than one percent of the LSE's
average daily volume." The standard used to measure securities transactions and "over-
all market activity" is "the monetary value of trading." Seeing as "[iln the U.K., share
prices are roughly one-seventh of what they are in the U.S. for a comparable security,"
the SEC therefore detailed the adjusted measures that it would have to utilize to measure
activity if operating in the United States. Id. at 37149.
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reflec[t] the difference in dollar value between U.S. and U.K. markets, and
the difference in the way trading is measured in the U.K." 93
Possible manipulation of regulatory procedure by trade entities is
another issue surrounding the exchange status debate. By allowing the
Section 5 exemption and not simultaneously stating that it is to be consid-
ered a temporary solution, Steil feels the SEC is effectually "promoting reg-
ulatory arbitrage."94 Tradepoint's application itself is a signal of such
regulatory circumvention. If a foreign ATS cannot achieve Section 6 status,
does not want to be a BD, or cannot be considered one since BD services
are not the crux of its operations, perhaps Section 5 is the path to follow. If
the Commission does not set a strict standard, it is only rational for trad-
ing systems to pursue the least burdensome means of regulation. More-
over, if classification determines whether an entity can operate in the U.S.
market, applicants will seek a label that allows entry into that market. As
this Note will examine later, this concern over manipulation can likewise
be raised if the SEC were to pursue the functional approach it already has
applied to domestic ATSs.
While Tradepoint achieved a Section 5 exemption, it is also necessary
to examine how a larger volume ATS might pursue the standard exchange
registration course under Section 6. Though Section 6 applies to "national
exchanges," 95 one must postulate how a foreign exchange could follow this
regulatory path in the future. If Tradepoint achieves the exchange exemp-
tion and operates "in" the United States, it would be extremely difficult to
argue that larger, well-managed electronic systems cannot do likewise
despite the historic bar to such activity.
The bureaucratic procedures outlined in Section 6 are rather exten-
sive. Among the administrative critiques are complaints that "(i) it takes
too long to register as an exchange; (ii) the statutory protections for ATS
exchanges may well prove insufficient; and (iii) the process of implement-
ing rule changes is unduly cumbersome."96 After filing an application to
become an exchange, applicants often wait two years before attaining the
SEC's decision.97 In the fast-paced securities world, the opportunity cost
of two years of inactivity could be devastating. Such administrative delay is
antithetical to the aim of diminished system congestion which lies at the
heart of the ATS movement. The additional concerns the SEC has regard-
ing foreign securities trading could even extend the waiting period beyond
two years.
93. Id.
94. Letter from Steil, supra note 87, at 2. "Regulatory arbitrage" is the phrase Steil
uses to describe what he believes would be the eventual outcome of a decision to allow
Tradepoint to enter the United States under a low-volume exemption. Steil suggests that
"[r]ather than create a formalized structure for promoting regulatory arbitrage between
National Securities Exchange (NSE) and ATS classifications, I believe that the Commis-
sion needs to consider seriously a much different approach." Id.
95. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) (1997). A national
exchange is subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
96. Letter from Bloomberg, supra note 28.
97. See id.
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Several critiques of exchange classification for an ATS generally
exist.98 Macey and O'Hara enumerated the problems. First, the trading of
NASDAQ securities would no longer be an option for the entity if classified
as an exchange.9 9 It could only engage in such conduct if admitted to the
NASDAQ/National Market System unlisted trading privileges plan, and
even then it would be barred from trading other unlisted securities. 10 0
This would be problematic as liquidity would be reduced. 10 1 Second,
requiring an ATS "to assure regulatory oversight of [its] participants" if
classified as an exchange would "add needless costs and uncertainty to the
business of providing alternative trading systems without increasing the
quality of surveillance currently provided by exchanges and other self-reg-
ulatory organizations."'1 2 Third, because ATSs would also be required to
"join market-wide plans to coordinate [their] activities, quotations and
trade reporting with other firms,"10 3 much of the electronic benefits would
be lost. Such coordination not only would diminish the value of its serv-
ices but would also curtail its order capacity. 10 4 This is neither desirable
to management nor consonant with innovation. Fourth, the authors show
that under current exchange requirements, the corporate governance
framework of an ATS would have to be completely overhauled (i.e.,
changed from a proprietary firm to a "member owned" firm "with public
representation on the board"'0 5 ) in order to achieve exchange status. Such
a redesign seems not only needless and costly, but would "undermine the
ability of ATS to develop and innovate."10 6 In its current state, exchange
classification is a most maligned regulatory avenue for ATSs. 10 7
98. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49. In addition to the problems Macey and
O'Hara suggest exchange classification would have, they briefly set out additional argu-
ments against such registration. They argue that under an exchange classification, ATSs
would be (1) unable to protect their customers property rights in information; (2)
unable to solve the conflict of interest problems that exist within firms that act simulta-
neously as brokers and dealers; and (3) unable to innovate to further improve market
conditions by reducing the transactions costs associated with secondary market trading.
See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id. See also supra note 19 for the requirements of Regulation ATS, describing the
coordination requirement for ATSs that trade "five percent or more of the volume in
national market system securities."
104. Its capacity would be lessened as its ability to handle orders would decrease. See
Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. The list of critiques of exchange classification for Tradepoint, and ATSs in gen-
eral, is extensive. One additional critique that Bloomberg L.P. offered in its August 28,
1998 letter is that as an exchange,
an ATS would lose many statutory protections it now enjoys, including effective
appeals to the Commission and the federal courts based on statutory protec-
tions provided to exchange members and members of the NASD under the
Exchange Act. In place of those protections, the ATS would have only the uncer-
tain and amorphous protections from, e.g., predation by other market centers,
that might be afforded it as an Intermarket Trading System (ITS).
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Some commentators feel that if Section 6 exchange status is the route
the SEC chooses to apply to ATSs, registration requirements for such elec-
tronic exchanges must be amended in order to remain consistent with the
SEC's ultimate goals of efficiency and openness to innovation.108 In addi-
tion to revising the existing framework in order to alleviate the shortcom-
ings and bureaucratic impediments mentioned above, Bloomberg L.P. has
presented various additional amendments which, in its opinion, should be
made to the exchange format.10 9 Roger D. Blanc has advocated four main
"adjustments and exemptions from current exchange regulation" which
"should be implemented":
(i) a for-profit ATS should not have enforcement powers or duties with
respect to the business conduct of its participants, which are essen-
tially its customers;
(ii) institutional participants should be exempted from the requirement,
applicable generally to exchange members, that they register as broker-
dealers or organize brokerage affiliates to act as the participants on the
ATS "exchange";
(iii) limitations on members' (i.e., participants') trading under section
11(a) of the Exchange Act should be relieved; and
(iv) with respect to treatment of foreign securities, issuers should not be
required to register under section 12 of the Exchange Act so long as the
audience for an ATS is limited to institutional investors and broker-deal-
ers, because these entities are allowed to purchase foreign securities in
an initial sale under Rule 144A of the Exchange Act. (emphasis
added).1 10
These suggestions appear to be reasonable, especially in light of the
institutional investor element.'1 ' Fewer protections are necessary since
institutions generally are more sophisticated than individual investors, able
to weigh risks and judge possible effects on its income, and often are
already regulated by governmental agencies other than the Commission
due to their unique nature.' 12 Regardless of the institution's actual success
in its market involvement, these corporate entities certainly do not need
the expensive protective services of the SEC. Suggestion iv is most perti-
nent to Tradepoint's application. The SEC has demonstrated concerns
See Letter from Bloomberg, supra note 28.
108. See supra notes 46 and 63 regarding the SEC's goals.
109. See Blanc, supra note 32, at 26, 29.
110. Id. at 30, 31. Section 12 of the Exchange Act, Registration Requirements for
Securities. Rule 144A (4)(i) permits such foreign trading:
In the case of securities of an issuer that is neither subject to Section 13 or 15(d)
of the Exchange Act, nor exempt from reporting pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b)
(Section 240.12g3-2(b) of this chapter) under the Exchange Act, nor a foreign
government as defined in Rule 405 (Section 230.405 of this chapter) eligible to
register securities under Schedule B of the Act, the holder and a prospective
purchaser designated by the holder have the right to obtain from the issuer,
upon request of the holder ...
17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1998).
111. Institutional investors include insurance companies, pension funds, banks. See
Blanc, supra note 32, at 31.
112. See id.
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beyond that of domestic ATSs when considering a foreign ATS's status.
Once again, Blanc highlights the institutional investor aspect of foreign
market access providers, repeating his endorsement of a hands-off regula-
tory policy when dealing with these market savvy investors.
B. Registration as a Broker-Dealer
At present, the majority of ATSs are registered as broker-dealers.1 13 While
they "must register with the SEC 114 and become a member of [a] self-regu-
lating organization (SRO)," 1 15 the registration requirements for BDs are
less burdensome than those for exchanges. 1 16 This is because BDs are free
from real-time market surveillance and exempt from the SEC's Automation
Review Policy. 11 7 Since registration procedures for BDs are comparatively
lenient, many seek BD status, at least while awaiting registration as an
exchange. 1 18 However, as many applicants have come to realize, the pro-
cess of becoming a registered BD can "be an extremely expensive process of
filing and refiling applications and rules." 119 This is because in addition to
registering with the SEC, and possibly with the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), "[a] firm is also subject to the require-
ments of the securities laws and registration requirements of any and all
states where it conducts a securities business."120 While many of the state
requirements are similar to those of the NASD and SEC, "many state regu-
lating agencies require that applicants provide additional documentation
113. See Silverman, supra note 6, at 1. See also note 13.
114. Registration as a BD is required under Section 15(a)(1) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. Section 15(b) describes the procedure for filing, while Section
15b1-1 details the application process as follows: "(a) An application for registration of
a broker or dealer filed pursuant to Section 15(b) shall be filed on Form BD in accord-
ance with the instructions." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15b, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4.
115. Domowitz, supra note 8, at 98.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See Letter from Bloomberg, supra note 28.
119. Id. The following BD registration requirements help illustrate why the process is
exhaustive. In addition to registering with the SEC, many BDs also file with the NASD.
The NASD requires a signed and notarized registration form (Form BD), Applicant Cer-
tification Form, Form U-4s and fingerprint cards for each employee who is required to
be registered as an agent or principal due to their activities, New Member Assessment
Reports, Firm Contact Questionnaire, a check or money order for the appropriate exam
and fingerprint fees as well as a series of informational and documentation require-
ments as outlined in Rule 1013(a)(2) of the NASD's Membership Proceedings. In brief,
the applicant must provide detailed business plans, description of financial controls and
description of supervisors and principals. The list of information required is extensive
since it requests very specific information.
In addition to SEC, NASD, and state requirements, "[clertain broker/dealers will be
subject to federal statutory provisions requiring them to become members of SIPC....
All non-bank broker/dealers registered with the SEC that conduct their principal busi-
ness within the United States, its territories, or possessions must become members of
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC)." National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers, Inc., How to Become a Member of the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc. (visited Nov. 8, 1999) <http://wwv.nasrd.com/4700_toc.html> [hereinafter
How to Become a Member].
120. How to Become a Member, supra note 119.
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and information directly to their offices to fulfill their application require-
ments." 12 1 For a BD with agents in multiple states, especially an electronic
BD that could easily be active in all fifty states as well as the District of
Columbia and U.S. territories, the state registration procedure can become
a seemingly endless bureaucratic process. Because of this, many advocate
modification of the BD regulatory procedure in the hope of achieving a less
onerous process. Among the suggested modifications is the elimination of
various filing requirements which some deem inapplicable to ATSs. 12 2
These requirements include, among other items, the submission of
FOCUS123 reports and the maintenance of a specific net capital
requirement. 124
C. SEC's Domestic-Functional Approach: Choice between Exchange
and Broker-Dealer Status
Ignoring alternate proposals that will be examined in the following sec-
tions, some see only a choice between BD and exchange regulatory status
for domestic entities akin to Tradepoint. 125 To determine which classifica-
tion should be applied to ATSs dealing in domestic securities, the SEC advo-
cates and has now codified a functional approach. Under this system,
"activities" and "trading volume" are to act as the determining characteris-
tics in the choice between BD and exchange status.12 6 While at present the
SEC has only set this procedure for domestic ATSs, a similar ruling could
easily have applied to Tradepoint-like systems. Many advocated a similar
approach to the SEC, in which regulation is "based on functional attributes
of a trading market" 12 7 rather than an entity simply assuming a title.
Under this looser approach, an entity's functions do not determine
whether or not an ATS is a BD or an exchange for regulatory purposes, but
rather the functions themselves determine what monitoring is necessary.
This method will be termed the 'purely functional' approach.
Proponents of the purely functional approach, as opposed to the func-
tional solution, cite as one of its benefits that "rather than on the basis of
some arbitrary technical categorization, firms [would] be able to select the
121. Id.
122. See id. for details regarding the suggested means of alleviating the BD registra-
tion process. See also note 119 for discussion of the extensive BD registration
requirements.
123. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.617 (1998) for FOCUS Report, Form X-17 A-5. Under Rule
17a-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, BDs are required to file certain specified
monthly or quaarterly reports on Form X-17 A-5. This Form, composed of several parts,
is known as a FOCUS Report which is an acronym for "Financial and Operational Com-
bined Uniform Single Report." See 17 C.F.R. § 1.10 (1998).
124. See Letter from Bloomberg, supra note 28.
125. See SEC Release No. 34-40760, supra note 13, at 70844. In the SEC's summary
regarding "Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems," the Commission
stated that it was "adopting new rules and rule amendments to allow alternative trading
systems to choose whether to register as national securities exchanges, or to register as
broker-dealers and comply with additional requirements under Regulation ATS . . ." Id.
126. See id.
127. Domowitz, supra note 8, at 95.
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precise services they wish to offer." 128 The purely functional approach
would appear to quash the practice of classification manipulation. This is
because if an ATS performed a certain service, that service would be regu-
lated regardless of the entity's title. 129 In addition, ATSs would not be lim-
ited to only performing the services its classification permits. Further,
supporters point out that under this purely functional approach, the SEC's
"regulatory objectives" would be achieved13 0 since two firms which "off[er]
the same bundle of services" would "be regulated the same way."13 1 Third,
it is contended that the purely functional approach "best promotes innova-
tion because it provides competitors with the maximum amount of flexibil-
ity consistent with regulatory objectives."'13 2
D. No SEC Regulation
Another proposal the SEC advanced in its discussion of alternatives for the
regulation of foreign market activities in the United States is to "rely solely
on home country regulation of the foreign market."1 33 While the Commis-
sion noted that the 'no regulation' method is at one extreme of the scale of
regulatory options,134 the proposal does merit analysis. The general fear
concerning foreign securities involves the adequacy of transparency.135 In
order to protect market participants, the Commission seeks to ensure that
"sufficient information is disclosed to U.S. investors regarding the risks of
trading on foreign markets."13 6 In addition to protective concerns, most
economists agree that a high degree of transparency results in an "efficient
market."137 The greater the disclosure of current information regarding
securities, the more efficient the market is.138 As a rule, foreign companies
128. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49.
129. See note 94 regarding the concern that regulatory arbitrage would result from
allowing Tradepoint to utilize the low-volume exemption as a means of registering in the
United States. This is similar to the concerns examined earlier regarding "regulatory
arbitrage."
130. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49. Presently, there is a lack of even-handed-
ness in the SEC's treatment of ATSs. "It makes no sense for two firms that offer the
same service to clients to be subject to different regulatory burdens merely because one
of these firms has been classified as an 'exchange' while the other has been classified as
a broker-dealer firm." Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. SEC Release No. 34-38672, supra note 45, at 30487. See also SEC Press Release
No. 97-43, SEC Solicits Comment on Regulation of Markets, 1.
134. See SEC Release No. 34-38672, supra note 45, at 30487. The Commission identi-
fies registration as an exchange and no regulation as the two extremes of the regulatory
spectrum.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 14. Generally, in terms of the SEC's regulation of domestic securities,
"[a]s long as the prospectus contains the required information and fully discloses the
risks of the offering, the SEC will permit the offering to go forward. The SEC does not
judge the merits of the offering as an investment but only seeks to ensure the full and
fair disclosure of all relevant facts about the issuer and the offering." James, supra note
32, at 227.
137. See Poser, supra note 2, at 7.
138. See id.
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do not disclose as much information as U.S. firms.139 Consequently, there
is concern that unsophisticated investors would be unable to judge the
investment risk involved when dealing in securities of foreign companies.
Tradepoint is comparatively transparent to the LSE. 140 This transparency
has factored into its attractiveness and perhaps has played a role in its suc-
cess with the SEC.
Despite the generally less stringent disclosure requirements of foreign
securities regulation, and more specifically, of the United Kingdom's regu-
latory scheme, U.K. exchanges and the securities traded on them are regu-
lated.141 The LSE runs the Official List and the Unlisted Securities Market
(USM), the former being the larger of its markets. 142 Tradepoint exchanges
securities listed on the Official List. In order for a company to trade on the
Official List it "must submit listing particulars" while the USM requires
that a prospectus be filed. 143 These documents encompass the disclosure
element which the SEC feels is most vital to investor protection. Similar
material must be included in both the listing and prospectus formats and
generally includes:
(a) the company name;
(b) its registered office;
(c) the date of incorporation;
(d) the company number;
(e) the names and addresses of persons giving a declaration as to
accuracy of the disclosure document;
(f) a declaration as to the accuracy of the disclosure document;
(g) the names of the company's auditors, their addresses and
qualifications;
(h) the name and address of the company's bankers;
(i) the sponsoring member firm;
() the name of the company's solicitors;
(k) details of the shares for which admission is sought;
(1) the company's objects;
(m) the company's authorized/issued capital;
(n) a summary of operations during the preceding three years;
(o) details of any group to which the company belongs (if applicable);
(p) the company accounts;
(q) financial information for last three years; and
(r) details about company management. 14 4
139. See Silverman, supra note 6, at 6; SEC Release No. 34-38672, supra note 45, at
12.
140. See Letter from Neuberger, supra note 70, at 1. Neuberger describes how "[ilt
is... a transparent market where all users of the system have access to exactly the same
information at exactly the same time."
141. The Financial Services Act 1986 provides the standard to which the U.K.'s mar-
kets are subject. See James, supra note 32, at 212.
142. See id. at 209-10. The USM is comprised primarily of newer and smaller compa-
nies than the Official List. See Huang, supra note 32, at 8.
143. See James, supra note 32, at 213.
144. Id. at 213-14. A complete listing of the requirements is located in sections 5 and
6 of the Yellow Book, the Exchange's Listing Rules. Id. at 212. See also Poser, supra note
2, at 314.
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The disclosure requirements in the United States differ from these. In
brief, a prospectus in the United States is required to include:
(a) a description of the company;
(b) a description of the securities;
(c) the terms of the offering;
(d) the capitalization of the company;
(e) market and dividend information;
(f) the compensation to be paid to underwriters of the issue;
(g) risk factors associated with the offering;
(h) a detailed description of the business;
(i) an identification of the directors and executive officers;
(j) related party transactions;
(k) the principal stockholders;
(1) management's discussion and analysis (MD&A) of the company's
financial condition and results of operations;
(in) the financial statements of the company; and
(n) selected financial information for the last five years. 145
While the United States requires the disclosure of certain risks, the United
Kingdom does not. Instead, the requirement regarding the financial
condition of the firm is to include "the group's prospects for at least the
current fiscal year" as well as profit forecasts, both of which might serve as
a window to its stability. 146
In addition to these initial requirements, the LSE has formal
requirements for quoting a security on its exchange. These requirements
include the following provisions:
[T]he company must be a plc; its accounts must be prepared in accordance
[with] UK Accounting Standards or their equivalent; all the securities of that
class must be admitted, be freely transferable (subject to some minor excep-
tions) ... [and undergo]... speedy registration; the directors [of the firm]
must adopt the Model Code on dealings in securities; and, the sponsors or
nominated adviser must ensure that the directors of the business under-
stand their responsibilities as directors of a quoted company.147
Listed companies also have continuing disclosure obligations. These
obligations include disclosing annual audited financial statements within
six months of the close of the company's fiscal year, an annual report
detailing any changes in management, new contracts entered into by the
firm, information as to whether profit forecasts were met, and additional
financial data.148 In U.S. securities law, there are proscriptions against
145. James, supra note 32, at 228-29.
146. Poser, supra note 2, at 314.
147. ROBERT C. RosEN, INTERNAIoNAL SEcURITIES REGULATION 23 (1986). To list secur-
ities, the company must have been run by the current management for three years; must
show it's independent of any holder who has 30% of stock; "and at least two brokers
must be willing to make a market in the securities." Id.
148. An annual report must include:
(1) any departures from standard accounting practices; (2) any differences
between its operating results and previous forecasts; (3) a geographical analysis
of its operations; (4) major holdings in other companies; (5) bank loans and
other borrowings; (6) significant contracts with the company of its subsidiaries
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violating the registration requirements 149 as well as exemptions from regu-
latory oversight in certain situations. 150 Nonetheless, if the SEC were to
rely solely on the U.K.'s supervision of Tradepoint, these would be the only
checks on market transparency.
E. Creation of a New Access Provider Classification
As an "intermediate approach" between no regulation and traditional
exchange regulation, the SEC has suggested "access provider" regulation of
ATSs in the course of its dialogue. 15 1 An access provider classification
would include all "entities that provide U.S. persons with direct access to
foreign markets."'1 52 The proposal of such a new regulatory classification
for foreign markets operating in the United States has received some sup-
port.153 A. Jared Silverman suggests that these access providers "could be
required to comply with limited record keeping, reporting and disclosure
requirements, and antifraud provisions"'154 rather than the exhaustive list
of BD or exchange requirements. He suggests that access providers could
register as securities information processors (SIP) that "could be limited to
trading registered foreign securities or to dealing with sophisticated par-
ties."1 55 This limitation poses no problem for entities such as Tradepoint
as it is used solely by institutional investors 156 and only executes trades
in which a director or substantial shareholder has a material interest; and (7)
biographical information about the company's outside directors.
Poser, supra note 2, at 316. Yellow Book, at 5.16-5.27. For further discussion of an
issuer's continuing obligations, see ROSEN, supra note 147, at 23.
149. See Poser, supra note 2, at 322.
150. The standard exemptions are:
(a) Private offers: there are no regulatory requirements to circulate an offer to
existing shareholders where private issues are concerned. For example, no pro-
spectus or listing particulars are necessary on a private placement. (b) Public
offers: no disclosure document is needed where the securities offered are: (i)
shares allotted by a capitalization issue, known as a bonus issue, to holders of
shares already listed; (ii) small share issues, such as where the shares to be
issued do not exceed those already listed by 10 per cent; or (iii) issues to
employees, if shares of the same class are already listed.
Id. at 214. In the United States, there are numerous exemptions for non-public offer-
ings. See id. at 225.
151. SEC Release No. 34-38672, supra note 45, at 30487.
152. Id.
153. See Silverman, supra note 6, at 6 for discussion of foreign market activities
alternatives.
154. Id. at 6.
155. Id. Silverman also advances the idea that BDs that are access providers should
be regulated in the same manner as SIPs. He suggests that "[t]hese broker-dealers could
also be permitted... to provide retail and sophisticated investors with electronic links to
foreign markets and to foreign markets that trade U.S. and foreign securities, regardless
of U.S. registration." Id.
156. See Letter from Steil, supra note 87, at 1. Steil supports Tradepoint's application
.on the basis that it offers U.S. institutional investors an excellent low-cost non-interme-
diated mechanism for trading U.K. stocks."
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involving LSE-listed securities.15 7 The various elements of this new classi-
fication and its benefits will be discussed below.
III. Permitting Tradepoint to Operate "In" the United States Was
Proper; but the SEC Should Eventually Regulate It Under a
New Access Provider Classification
Until a new regulatory procedure for foreign ATSs is established, granting
Tradepoint the Section 5 exemption was proper. This decision will provide
new opportunities for U.S. investors by widening their choice of invest-
ments and setting higher transparency and openness standards than the
LSE.158 Presently, if a U.S. investor wishes to buy on the LSE, it must act
through a broker transacting on the LSE or a London affiliate, or buy a
listed U.S. depository receipt listed on a domestic exchange. Both of these
procedures are expensive because of commissions and fees.' 5 9 These
added expenses would be eliminated under a Section 5 exemption and
"U.S. based fund managers and brokers" would be able "to trade in U.K.
equities without incurring the expenses of having to go through an inter-
mediary." 160 However, the Section 5 exemption should not be the guiding
example of how an entity gains entry "into" the United States.16 1 It is sim-
ply a means of avoiding the classification controversy and fails to set a
viable precedent. In addition to the short-sightedness of Tradepoint's low-
volume nature, "it makes no sense to provide special exemptive treatments
for alternative trading mechanisms that are of low volume."162 This is
because:
This would simply allow competitors to avoid burdensome regulation by
remaining small. The sheer number of alternative trading systems would
proliferate not for reasons of market demand, but rather simply to avoid the
costs of complying with burdensome regulation. Moreover, this requirement
157. Silverman also suggests that in addition to requiring access providers that link
U.S. members and foreign markets to register as SIPS, "foreign markets, information
vendors, and other access providers could be required to register as SIPs or to conduct
their U.S. activities through another registered SIP." Silverman, supra note 6, at 6.
158. See Letter from Neuberger, supra note 70, at 1.
159. See Ip, supra note 48, at A6. See also Faith Glasgow, Survey - Share Dealing:
Trade's up at Tradepoint - The UK's most recent stock exchange distinguishes itself from
competitors by offering direct access for fund managers. How viable an alternative is it to
the main exchange?, INVESTORS CHRONICLE, Nov. 20, 1998, at 58. From the buy side per-
spective, "[i]t makes no sense for a US broker to have to pay brokerage commission to a
UK broker - why pay commission to your competitor when you don't need to? By join-
ing the Tradepoint Stock Exchange, they are given true independence." April 1999 News-
letter <http://www.tradepoint.co.uk/newsletapr99_3.html>. In addition to Tradepoint
being less costly due to the lack of a middleman, Tradepoint was "launched on the back
of the theory that phone trading was inefficient and that the market would welcome a
cheap and efficient alternative." Glasgow, supra, at 58.
160. SEC Approves Tradepoint to Enter U.S., supra note 34.
161. While Benn Steil "endorsed direct U.S. investor access to Tradepoint," he "ques-
tioned the need for the exchange to win SEC approval on the grounds of its size."
Kentouris, supra note 22, at 21.
162. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49.
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would seriously impair technological innovation. Technological innovations
often require economies of scale to be cost-effective. 163
Though this argument focuses on domestic ATSs, similar arguments could
easily apply to Tradepoint.
According to Laura S. Unger, Commissioner of the SEC, the Commis-
sion granted Tradepoint an exemption based solely on its limited volume
nature. Ms. Unger stated that "[i]f Tradepoint's worldwide average daily
trading volume exceeded ten percent of the volume of the LSE... the Com-
mission would reevaluate Tradepoint's exemption from exchange registra-
tion."164 This statement reflects a recurring critique of the SEC in
commentary prior to the exemption order. It appears that using volume as
a standard fails to address the larger and newer issues that systems such as
Tradepoint present. Unger suggested the uncertainty of this approach by
noting that the SEC is "still assessing the impact of U.S. investors trading
unregistered foreign securities and the long-term regulatory approach that
we should take."165 Thus, the volume approach may very well be only a
temporary solution and the SEC must undertake further regulatory work.
While the SEC officially granted the exemption to Tradepoint because of
the benefits its competition would provide, the permanency of this solution
is still questionable.
Cross-border and international securities matters create inherently
conflicting problems for the SEC. While the Commission continues to rec-
ognize the need for investment protection, it also recognizes the need to
provide "U.S. investors" with "greater and more instantaneous access to
foreign securities markets" so that they can "trade securities more effi-
ciently."16 6 Currently, such instantaneous access is not permitted because
of the dissimilar disclosure requirements between U.S. and foreign
exchanges differing accounting standards. Therefore, in order to open up
U.S.-foreign trading, the Commission would have to reach a point of accept-
able shared accounting standards.
In order to achieve this goal, U.S. and foreign securities commissions
are working to establish a set of core accounting standards for interna-
tional use. Rising to this challenge, the International Accounting Stan-
dards Committee completed a proposed set of core standards in December
1998. Both the SEC and the International Organization of Securities Com-
missions (IOSCO) are now in the process of evaluating the proposed
framework. If the IOSCO approves the criteria, it appears that the SEC
would follow suit, thereby abandoning its long-held U.S. GAAP reconcilia-
tion rule. Such abandonment would open the door to an entirely larger
market of opportunities for U.S. investors. However, these changes are still
to be determined. Until they are, Tradepoint's low-volume status will have
to remain in order for it to continue operations under this exemption.
163. Id.
164. Laura S. Unger, Commissioner, U.S. Securities & Exhange Commission,
Remarks at the Ninth Annual New England Securities Law Conference, June 11, 1999.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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The progress in the SEC's Tradepoint decision is no small matter even
if its form is flawed. By all accounts, the SEC has permitted a foreign
exchange to operate in the United States. Stephen Lofchie, a U.S. attorney,
recognized the impact of the SEC decision: "This is the most significant
liberalization of international securities trading since the adoption of rule
15a-6 of the SEC rules in 1989."167
Despite the inadequacy of this approach, it is not unsafe for Trade-
point to function under the exempt exchange classification until the SEC
sets a clear ATS guideline for foreign systems. This is mainly because only
institutional investors can access Tradepoint. x68 While there are certainly
protection concerns regarding institutional investors, they are not as cru-
cial as those involving the general investing public, and, more importantly,
these sophisticated investors are already "allowed to purchase foreign
securities in an initial sale under Rule 144A of the Exchange Act."16 9 Rule
144A is "'a training ground for foreign companies' seeking U.S. investors,"
since it allows these foreign firms to execute a private placement offering
and then convert it to a public offering, thereby complying with all of the
disclosure requirements a public offering demands.1 70 This vehicle is
widely used and already has exposed U.S. investors to foreign securities.
There are further reasons why Tradepoint has the opportunity to be a
valuable addition to the U.S. securities market. Beyond its order-based,
screen-operated nature, the anonymity and level of transparency that
Tradepoint affords are unique to the system and contribute to its popular-
ity.17 1 Anonymity is maintained since parties to a trade are not disclosed
on the screen, and the system executes settlement via the London Clearing
167. He further noted how this option is not available to larger institutions: "The
conditions that the Commission has set won't allow the major European stock
exchanges to qualify for U.S. operation." Tradepoint Becomes First U.S. Foreign Stock
Exchange to Operate in U.S. (last modified June 15, 1999) <http://
www.tradepoint.co.uk/news_sec.html. Rule 15a-16 is the "Exemption of Foreign Bro-
kers or Dealers" regulation. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Broker-Dealer Regula-
tion Registration and Regulation of Brokers and Dealers, CCH 'I 25,006B.
168. See Letter from Steil, supra note 87, at 1.
169. Blanc, supra note 32, at 32. The SEC adopted Rule 144A of the Securities
Exchange Act in 1990. This rule "expanded trading in the private-placement market.
where issuers sell to 'qualified institutional buyers' mainly insurance companies, banks,
mutual funds and pension funds." Judith Burns, 'Aircraft Carrier' Overhaul Aims to Cur-
tail Surge of Private Placements, WALL ST. J, Jan. 5, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJ
5435357.
170. Burns, supra note 169. The practice of converting a private placement to a pub-
lic offering was at one time prohibited. However, the SEC reversed this policy in its
1988 Exxon Capital decision, in which Exxon Corp's financing unit was permitted to
convert a private-placement debt offering to a public one. This was most important to
foreign issuers because they gained a means of performing a public offering in the
United States. Private placements are "booming." Yet, the SEC is considering slowing
this tide by amending U.S. securities laws to "reduce the use of private placements by
encouraging companies to issue stocks and bonds through public offerings." This pro-
posal is called the "aircraft carrier." Id.
171. See Glasgow, supra note 159, at 58. Glasgow and Jones describe the positive
aspects of Tradepoint as: its lack of middleman fees as compared with the LSE, its ano-
nymity and transparency as well as its low trading costs and entry fees.
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House. 172 This is important because according to SEI Investments, "the
largest transaction cost is not the commission or market-maker's spread,
but this 'market impact' as other traders move market prices in reaction to
block trades."173 When coupled with the system's overall operating effi-
ciency, Tradepoint becomes an attractive option. However, some disagree
with this perception of the system. Commentators complain that the sys-
tem lacks the same liquidity as the LSE and that it focuses on institutional
sized deals.' 74 However, as stated previously, less liquidity does not
ensure a safer environment for investors,175 and its institutional bent con-
versely contributes to its easing of protection concerns. Moreover, an order
on Tradepoint is virtually indistinguishable from a domestic one.'7 6 Thus,
there appears to be no strong reason for banning Tradepoint from operat-
ing in the United States.
172. The London Clearing House is an independent entity serving as a central
counterparty which "financially assure[s] all of the trades executed via Tradepoint."
Clive Davidson, London Clearing House Uses Technology to Reinvent Itself, SEcs. INDUSTRY
NEws, Feb. 8, 1999, at 2. See also Glasgow, supra note 159, at 58 (stating that settlement
occurs at the end of every business day through the clearing house); and Tradepoint
Financial Networks PLC (last modified June 15, 1999) <http://www.tradepoint.co.uk/
pr990323.html>.
Now more than 100 years old, LCH was, until two years ago, much like any
other clearinghouse: a low-profile, back-office service center for the London
International Financial Futures and Options Exchange, London Metal Exchange
and International Petroleum Exchange (in 1995 it also took on the clearing for
the Tradepoint Stock Exchange). Then in October 1996, its members, which
now number 114, plus the exchanges, bought LCH from its pervious owners, a
consortium of six clearing banks. Now the clearinghouse could respond to the
wishes of the broader community of its members, who made it clear they wanted
to expand the role of the organization.
Davidson, supra at 2.
173. Alpert, supra note 13, at 22. The system maintains anonymity since "[u]sers can
buy or sell UK stocks without having to disclose their complete trading intentions."
Members achieve this as they "are given the opportunity to advertise their own IOIs (via
AutEx and Bloomberg) without disclosing their trading intentions." SEC Approves Trade-
point to Enter U.S., supra note 34.
174. See Jones, supra note 34, at 39.
Unfortunately, however, few small investors have access to Tradepoint because
only a handful of private-client stockbrokers are members of the exchange. And
Tradepoint isn't suitable for all deals. Liquidity on the market is thin compared
with the LSE. Mr. Urquhart Stewart says: "it's all very well them saying they can
beat the LSE's prices, but when you try to deal you find you can only do so in
institutional sizes."
Id.
175. See Letter from Steil, supra note 87, at 1.
176. See Silverman, supra note 6, at 6. According to Silverman, orders are indistin-
guishable due to technology.
It is possible for United States investors to obtain real-time information about
trading on foreign markets from a number of different sources and electronically
to enter and execute orders from the United States. Enhanced technology can
make U.S. originated orders indistinguishable from orders originating in the
country in which the market is situated. Technology also permits members of
foreign securities markets to trade without being physically present on the mar-
ket floor or establishing a physical presence in the market's home country.
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A. Registration as An Exchange: Not a Solution
Registration under Section 6 of the Act was never a viable option for Trade-
point. While exempt exchange status is not desirable as a permanent solu-
tion, neither is traditional exchange registration. A Section 5 exemption
seeks to avoid many of the burdens of traditional exchange registration.
Though most arguments are against exchange regulation of ATSs in gen-
eral, and not of Tradepoint specifically, the same reasoning applies. First,
commentators have pointed out that this "regulatory approach is highly
inconsistent with modern theories about how to regulate complex sys-
tems."17 7 It would "undermine the operations" of ATSs as they would be
"(1) unable to protect their customers' property rights in information; (2)
unable to solve the conflict of interest problems that exist within firms that
act simultaneously as brokers and dealers; and (3) unable to innovate to
further improve market conditions by reducing the transactions costs asso-
ciated with secondary market trading."178
Bloomberg addresses the more administrative drawbacks of exchange
registration for ATSs. 179 It cites the length of the registration process and
the "cumbersome" nature of attempting to change regulatory rules as rea-
sons against exchange registration. 180 It, too, echoes the protection con-
cerns by complaining that "the statutory protections for ATS exchanges
may well prove insufficient."''1 This concern is most pertinent to systems
such as Tradepoint as it involves the additional foreign securities element
that many fear. Though some may disregard the critiques of exchange reg-
ulation as trivial reasons for advocating an alternative plan, administrative
concerns are of paramount importance. The whole basis for the success of
computer-linked systems such as Tradepoint is the efficiency resulting
from their electronic nature. By using Tradepoint, there is no need for
intermediaries and the cost disadvantage of the U.S. distance from local
foreign markets would be eliminated.18 2 This cost advantage is character-
istic of most non-traditional markets. Because they are private, small, and
do not involve middlemen in each transaction, "the alternative trading sys-
tems are driving down the cost of trading and spurring innovations such as
extended hours and lightening-fast Internet trades."'1 3 With Tradepoint,
U.S. investors would be on an "equal playing field" with U.K. brokers since
177. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49.
178. Id.
179. See Letter from Bloomberg, supra note 28.
180. Id. The letter discusses the "extraordinarily protracted" process of registering as
an exchange "particularly for a start-up entity but also, [they] expect, for an ATS that has
been in business for some time." Id. It continues to detail the administrative burdens
that accompany registration.
181. Id.
182. See Letter from Steil, supra note 87, at 1; Blanc, supra note 32, at 34.
183. Ip, supra note 3, at Al. The cost difference can be significant. "Market makers
pocket the spread between the bid and ask prices for a stock - that can range between
five cents and 75 cents. When an ECN processes trades, it charges a fee of a couple of
cents per share." Alpert, supra note 13, at 19. Because of this, Tradepoint's "aim is to be
the lowest cost stock exchange in the world." SEC Approves Tradepoint to Enter U.S.,
supra note 34.
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the U.S. investors would have equal access at equal cost for both buy and
sell side participants.18 4 Therefore, imposing unruly administrative bur-
dens would have been counter productive.
Moreover, regulation of Tradepoint as an exchange would have
been unattractive since it is likely that under an exchange classification,
the SEC would have imposed additional conditions on the system. 185
Specifically, the SEC would have required that it be able to gain
access to books and records, lists of U.S. members, daily activity sum-
maries (pound versus dollar equivalents), total trade volume numbers,
the system's surveillance procedures, and response time com-
parisons for U.S. and non-U.S. Members. 186 Tradepoint would also
184. See Kentouris, supra note 22, at 21. This argument, according to Kentouris, was
put forward by Bloomberg "which provides its users with access to Tradepoint prices."
The SEC noted in its recent release that "[a] number of commentators stated that the
Tradepoint System would enable broker-dealers in the United States to compete on equal
footing with foreign broker-dealers with respect to trades in U.K. securities." SEC
Release No. 34-41199, supra note 23. The buy/sell side differentiation is important.
While most stress the benefits to buy-side participants, "ft]he sell side can also take
advantage of the benefits of direct membership of a UK exchange, such as a stamp duty
tax relief, enabling trading on the same basis as UK based Market Makers. Tradepoint is
the only exchange to provide stamp duty relief in the USA." Tradepoint Financial Net-
works PLC (last modified June 15, 1999) <http://www.tradepoint.co.uk/
newslet apr99_3.html>.
185. See SEC Release No. 34-40161, supra note 29, at 5. "The Commission proposes
to impose other conditions on the Exchange besides the low volume requirements dis-
cussed above. In general, these conditions would allow the Commission to monitor the
Exchange for compliance with all applicable sections of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act (such as the anti-fraud and securities registration sections), and would
ensure that the Commission has access to books, records and personnel of the Exchange
should the need arise." In SEC Release No. 34-41199 the Commission enumerated the
conditions for the low-volume exemption. Among the finalized requirements are:
(a) Daily summaries of trading and time-sequenced records of each transaction
involving a U.S. Member; (b) Information disseminated to U.S. Members; (c)
Daily pound and the equivalent dollar value of transactions; (d) A list of securi-
ties for which U.S. orders are accepted; and (e) Copies of Member applications
and standards for admission to the Exchange ... [it] will also be required to
provide 30 days prior notice to the Commission of any material changes in the
operation of the Tradepoint System .... direct access to real-time quotes and
trading information... on a quarterly basis within 30 days of the end of each
quarter .... (a) Total volume and average daily volume... (i) Number of units
of securities... (ii) Number of transactions... (iii) Monetary value.. . and (b)
Records regarding the identity of U.S. Members ... and the identity of those
denied participation in the Tradepoint System and the reason for such denial...
SEC Release No. 34-41199, supra note 23, at 14958.
186. See SEC Release No. 34-40161, supra note 29, at 37150. Response time con-
cerns factor highly in Bloomberg's proposal regarding the regulation of ATSs generally.
Bloomberg advocates two separate supervisory models based upon the manner of
response an ATS uses.
Our proposal set forth in the Bloomberg October Letter asks the Commission to
distinguish between those ATSs that respond to non-participant orders immedi-
ately and that provide direct connection to such non-participants on request,
and those that do not. If an ATS responds immediately to non-participants
orders and provides a direct connection on request, it should qualify to receive
order messages, not executions, [whereas] . .. [if an ATS does not meet the
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have had to maintain an agent for service of process in the United
States.1 s7
Furthermore, a Section 5 exemption was inapplicable because while
Tradepoint is presently a low-volume creature, 188 there is no guarantee that
it will remain a minor player in the securities world. Despite its fiscal
losses,18 9 and financial difficulties, 190 Tradepoint is strategically growing
in its global presence and experienced a record month in January of
standard of providing direct connections on request and responding immedi-
ately, that ATS should be subject to execution messages from NASDAQ.
Letter from Bloomberg, supra note 28, at 6. The distinction between execution messages
as opposed to direct connections is important. If a large volume investor has a high level
of technology available to it, direct connections could be provided. However, if an inves-
tor does not have access to such technology,
NASDAQ can and should supply high-speed data links and automatic re-routing
software to give them a feasible alternative to execution message delivery. Using
such technology, a 'direct hit' through execution message delivery is not supe-
rior from the point of view of non-participants. If NASDAQ installs high-speed
T-1 communications lines on a system-wide basis, the three-second delay that a
non-participant currently experiences between transmission of a NASDAQ
SelectNet order and the receipt of a response would practically disappear.
Id. This is most important as the SEC must attempt to provide a fair trading system. If
there was a large disparity in the response time to high-tech participants and low-tech
participants, the level of fairness would be far too slanted in favor of the former.
Another key element of the Bloomberg proposal is the effect of placing an order that has
already been filled. For instance, "[i]f an ATS sends a rejection to NASDAQ because the
order has already been filled in the ATS, NASDAQ will have the opportunity to immedi-
ately resend the message order to another ATS or market maker. Re-routing of orders
would be efficient and fast." Id.
187. See SEC Release No. 34-40161, supra note 29, at 37150.
188. As of November 20, 1998, Tradepoint had "85 fully signed up members (both
stockbroking firms and institutional investors), and is handling around £ 35m of busi-
ness per day, compared with the LSE's turnover of pounds 3bn - roughly one percent of
the market." Glasgow, supra note 159, at 58.
189. See, e.g., Tradepoint Financial Networks PLC Unaudited Results for The Three
Months Ended 30 June 1998, CANADA NavsWiR, Aug. 28, 1998 [hereinafter Unaudited
Results]; Unaudited Financial Results for the Nine Months Ended 31 December 1997, CAN-
ADA NmvsWiRn, Feb. 27, 1998.
Tradepoint Financial Networks ... has.plunged further into the red. The group
revealed its half-year losses had widened from GBP 3 million to GBP 3.6 million,
mainly due to higher development costs. Tradepoint conceded it was unlikely to
become self-financing in the short term and would require additional funds.
However, there has been 'solid growth' in order book volumes.
Tradepoint's Troubles Grow, EVENING STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1998, at 34. Despite this, for the
year ending March 1999, the company's pre-tax loss was (7.30) £m. as compared to
(6.67) £m. for 1998. Tradepoint Financial Networks PLC, Five Year Summary P&L with
Balance Sheet (Mar. 10, 1999) <http://www.hemscott.co.uk/EQUITIES/company/corp/
crpo3067.html,.
190. In December of 1998, Tradepoint announced that it was "seeking renewed
financing." Suzy Jagger, U.S. Group Seeking Tradepoint Stake, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 17,
1999, available at 1999 WL 12600741. Presently,
[i]t is understood that Cantor Fitzgerald is seeking to buy venture capitalists
Apax Partners' 29pc stake in Tradepoint. And insider said: 'It is well-known
that Tradepoint will need to re-finance over the next few months. Cantor's are
rumored to be in talks with Tradepoint which would fulfill their ambition to
have an exchange facility in Britain.
Cornell International Law Journal
1999.191 The system's "[t]ransaction volumes [grew] considerably in
[1998]" though as of the end of the year "the company ha[d] not achieved
the market share necessary to reach profitability. Income from operations"
for 1998 reached 675,235 pounds. This represented a 38% increase from
the prior year, yet as of January 2000, Tradepoint "still has only about 0.5%
of the U.K. share-trading volume."1 92 On August 14, 1998, Tradepoint
became the first exchange outside Hong Kong to receive approval by the
Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission to serve as a direct channel
for Hong Kong equities brokers and fund managers to access the U.K.
equity market.193 In addition to its U.S. approval, 194 Tradepoint is also
growing within Britain itself.19 5
Though some have always felt that Tradepoint "needs direct U.S. par-
ticipation if it wants to undercut LSE business,"'196 the company has made
strides within its own geographic borders when it entered into an agree-
ment with Royalblue's Fidessa system, a British financial trading system.19 7
Fidessa is capable of "handl[ing] SETS, the London Stock Exchange's new
Id.
191. On January 20, 1999, trading "totaled more than pounds 200 million." Nick
Goodway, Business Day: Tradepoint Teeters on Brink of Red Alert, EVENING STANDaRD, Jan.
29, 1999, at 42. However, this is not to say that the financial situation of Tradepoint is
anything but dismal. In fact, Goodway writes that the British system
is in danger of running out of money again .... The electronic stock mar-
ket.., revealed that it lost pounds 2 million, up from pounds 1.78 million, in
the three months to 31 December. By the same date, cash in the bank had dwin-
dled to just pounds 2.08 million which at current rates would see it in the red by
April. But Tradepoint is hopeful of raising more money before that dreaded
overdraft appears. It said today that it is talking to advisers about a number of
new financing options.
Id. These options can include "another rights issue and partnerships with institutional
investors and Internet brokers, particularly in the United States, who could direct order
flows through Tradepoint. The company last raised pounds 11.4 million through a res-
cue rights issue in August 1997." Id.
192. Tradepoint Financial Networks plc Unaudited Results for the Year Ended 31 March
1999 (last modifiedJune 15, 1999) <http://www.tradepoint.co.uk/pr990615.html>. Yet,
despite these problems, Tradepoint plans on breaking even by the end of 2000. "[It]
aims to capture 5.5% of all equity trade in the U.K., its break even point, by the end of
the fourth quarter, up from 1% it currently trades," according to Richard Kilsby, the
Company's chief executive. Global Finance: Tradepoint Sees Break-Even, WALL Sr. J. EUR..
Feb. 11, 2000, at 22. Note: there is a .5% differential between what sources say Trade-
point's market share is. Silvia Ascarelli, U.K. Regulators Seek Advice on ways to Oversee
Electronic Trading Networks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2000.
193. See Unaudited Results for Three Months Ended 30 June 1998, supra note 189; see
also Glasgow, supra note 159, at 58.
194. See Glasgow, supra note 159, at 60. "Inroads" refers to its application's progress
within the SEC. "In early July, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
approved for publication in the Federal Register its application for exemption from regis-
tration as a National Securities Exchange." Id.
195. See id.
196. Kentouris, supra note 22, at 21. Thus far, Tradepoint has only been operating in
the red. Commentators such as Kentouris feel that the achievement of U.S. participation
is the primary means for Tradepoint to pose a threat to the established LSE.
197. See QL Stock Market Letter, WORLD REPORTER, July 30, 1998, available at 1998
WL 11182527.
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order driven market."198 According to the agreement reached, investment
banks that use Fidessa will be able to "execute orders on either Tradepoint
or SETS."'199 This may open an entirely new customer base not only
because the "trading costs and the entry fee [of Tradepoint] are markedly
lower" than that of SETS,20 0 but also because SETS has been criticized by
users since its October 1997 introduction.20 1 Although Tradepoint only
realized 2% of its targeted market share as of December 1998, the organiza-
tion "produced research showing that brokers trade on a daily basis on the
LSE at worse prices than they would have got on [Tradepoint's] own elec-
tronic exchange." 20 2 This information eventually could help bolster Trade-
point's standing within the United Kingdom.
However, most important to the growth of Tradepoint is the activity of
a consortium in May 1999. This group, composed of Instinet, Warburg
Dillon Read, Morgan Stanley, American Century, J.P. Morgan and Archipel-
ago "paid about $21 million to rescue the floundering London-based elec-
198. Id. SETS stands for the "Stock Exchange's Electronic Trading Service." The sys-
tem was introduced in 1997 and "has led to a reduction in the cost of share transac-
tions." Trading System Helps Cut Costs, DiE WELT, Oct. 6, 1998, at 20, available at 1998
WL 23871573. SETS "automatically links sale and buying orders, will be made more
available to individuals because the minimum limit for transactions is being aban-
doned." See London Stock Exchange Changes for the SETS System, L'EcHo, May 3, 1998,
at 20, available in 1998 WL 8481062.
199. See QL Stock Market Letter, supra note 197 (emphasis added).
200. Glasgow, supra note 159, at 58.
201. See London Stock Exchange, Dancing to a New Tune, EUROMONEY MAGAZtNE, Aug.
10, 1998, at 24. According to Legal & General Group PLC's investment director David
Rough, SETS is "not a success" "since it has made it harder to trade in all but thirty
London-quoted equities." Legal & General Investment Director Criticises SETS Trading
System, AFX (U.K.), Apr. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 17622163. Rough states that for
the top thirty FTSE 100 stocks, SETs have "made a big improvement - spreads have nar-
rowed and there is greater liquidity," however, "outside that group this is not the case."
Id. Rough also criticized the system, claiming that it only works "efficiently" between
the hours of 9:30a.m. and 3:30a.m. because of the LSE's new dealing system. Id. Nic
Stuchfield, chief executive of Tradepoint, suggests that SETS has not been more success-
ful for the same reasons that Tradepoint has only made "relatively little headway into the
London Stock Exchange's territory." Id. This reason, according to Stuchfield, is that
"there's a natural resistance in the U.K to the idea of posting bids and offers publicly on
the screen, rather than privately through a broker."
202. Nick Goodway, Business Day: Tradepoint 'fair play' call to SFA, EvEmnNG STAN-
DARD, Dec. 9, 1998, at 41 [hereinafter Goodway 2]. In order to show this, the company
monitored deals struck on the LSE's electronic trading system over the past three
months against the prices showing on its own system at exactly the same time.
The result invariably was that the LSE price, both for selling and buying, was
worse by anything from 12p to 5p per share.
The price also tended to be worst on small, usually retail, trades of 10,000
shares or fewer. The net shortfall on such trades ranged from only a few pounds
to several hundred and in a few cases thousands of pounds.
An example was Halifax on 13 October. In the half hour from 11:20a.m., 57
trades on SETS ranged from 0.5p to 5.3p a share higher than the bid price on
Tradepoint. So in that period alone investors lost a total of more than pounds
800, ranging in individual amounts from pounds 1 to pounds 200 and all for
trades of 10,000 shares or fewer.
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tronic exchange .... -203 Tradepoint's financial woes had been continuing,
as the entity suffered an $11.5 million loss in the fiscal year ending March
1999 "on revenue of just $1 million."20 4 Because the exchange had only
captured less than one percent of the LSE's volume by that point, profit
seemed unlikely. 205 However, "Tradepoint's new 54% shareholders bring
plenty of liquidity, accounting for about a quarter of the LSE's volume,
between them."206 The power of this combined grouping brings with it
several "potential opportunities" for Tradepoint, one originally thought to
use the establishment of a Frankfurt European trading system anticipated
for the Summer 2000, but now a potentially much larger project of estab-
lishing a pan-European market is planned. 20 7 The consortium's action has
Id.
203. Alpert, supra note 13, at 22. See also Tradepoint Financial Networks PLC (last
modified Sept. 7, 1999) <http://www.tradepoint.co.uk/pr990709.html>. This money
was vital as "the Company required additional finance to ensure its long-term viability.
Cash resources would without an injection, have fallen below the regulatory minimum
required as a Recognised Investment Exchange." Tradepoint Financial Networks PLC (last
modifiedJune 15, 1999) <http://www.tradepoint.co.uk/pr990615.html>. See also David
Fairlamb & Stanley Reed, Frankfurt's Power Play, Bus. WK., Dec. 27, 1999/Jan. 3, 2000,
at 80EB (listing the amount of money injected into Tradepoint by the Consortium as
$22.4 million). Due to this change in the shareholder base, Tradepoint has decided to
no longer be listed on the Canadian Ventures Exchange (formerly the Alberta and Van-
couver Stock Exchange) as of January 31, 2000. Originally, Tradepoint was listed on the
Vancouver Exchange because a large portion of the Company's shares were held by
Canadians. Tradepoint Financial Network PLC - Tradepoint Financial Delists from CDNX,
CANADLAN STOCK WATCH, Jan. 20, 2000, at 2000 WL 6296194. See also infra note 207
(discussing an addition to the consortium).
204. Id. The highlights from the company's unaudited financials for the year ended
31 March 1999 are as follows: "Loss for the period of £7,295,667 (1998: 6,669,990),
Operating costs £8,240,856 (1998: 7,561,566), Depreciation and amortisation
£1,035,962 (1998: 1,090,869), Secured a long term refinancing package with a Consor-
tium led by Instinet Corporation, Subject to shareholder approval, the refinancing pack-
age will raise approximately £13,100,000 net of expenses." Tradepoint Financial
Networks PLC (last modified June 15, 1999) <http://www.tradepoint.co.uk/
pr990615.html>.
205. See Alpert, supra note 13, at 22.
206. Id.
207. In June of 1999, the Frankfurt plan was considered as well as various other iden-
tified opportunities including:
the use of the Tradepoint Stock Exchange by Consortium members could sub-
stantially improve the level of Tradepoint's trading volumes; the global presence
of the Consortium members and their focus on reducing transaction costs,
together with market and technological efficiencies, should assist Tradepoint's
participation in the evolution of a global market exchange model; a planned
electronic link between Instinet and Tradepoint, to allow Instinet customers to
route orders to the Tradepoint Stock Exchange; and working in co-operation,
Tradepoint and the Consortium will have opportunities to maximise the use of
the Tradepoint technology and regulatory license by broadening the range of
securities traded.
Tradepoint Financial Networks PLC (last modified June 15, 1999) <http://
www.tradepoint.co.uk/pr990615.html>; see also Fairlamb & Reed, supra note 203, at
80EB. Yet now, the scope of Tradepoint's expansion plan is far greater. Recently joining
the consortium is ABN Amro Holding NV. ABN is hoping Tradepoint will succeed in its
plan to launch a Pan-European market by the end of 2000 as a rival to the combined
eight European Exchanges. See John Carreyrou, Deals & Deal Makers: ABN Amro
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helped to increase the value of Tradepoint's shares "and boosted the firm's
stock market value from $50 million to $300 million."208 Because of this,
it has been observed that "Tradepoint is now a credible rival to the LSE."209
This stride has added to the optimism of Tradepoint's management as
plans for future growth are again taking form.210 Within a year, "Trade-
point expects to offer its own trading in Europe's top 300 stocks," and with
the addition of the U.S. approval,211 low-volume may no longer be a char-
acterizing element of the system.212 Tradepoint's growth is furthered by
several U.S. institutions that are currently completing their membership
applications in an effort to begin trading through the system.213 To accom-
modate the anticipated growth, the company has added new enhanced fea-
tures to the system in an effort to monopolize on the new U.S. entry. An
easier "point and click method for building rules" has been introduced.214
This will help to save time and "reduc[e] the risk of incorrect data
entry.1215 The company also added a "new timer function" to the system
that allows one to "release orders at specific time intervals," "the ability to
accumulate and monitor the total value of executed orders" and "a library
of sample rules. '216
Decides to Back Tradepoint, Buying 9% Stake, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1999, at C18. Trade-
point is hoping to lure "big international investors who are frustrated at the bureaucratic
logjam holding up attempts to meld the existing eight European stock markets .... "
Andrew Garfield, Tradepoint Signs up Partners for European Exchange, TiE IND EPENrN -
LONDON, Feb. 11, 2000, at 20. If successful, the Company's growth potential could be
seemingly limitless.
208. Alpert, supra note 13, at 22.
209. Id.
210. In the United States, "Tradepoint's target market on the buy and sell side is 100
firms... but that could get much bigger if the exchange expands trading to include
European equities - expected to be in place before the end of 1999." Tradepoint Finan-
cial Networks PLC (last modified June 15, 1999) <http://www.tradepoint.co.uk/
news_sec.html>.
211. U.S. approval can be a major help for the company. According to Tradepoint's
sales literature,
U.S. fund managers are used to using electronic trading systems. Domestic Elec-
tronic Crossing Networks (ECNs) and new electronic matching systems seem to
proliferate by the week in the U.S.A. Yet, U.S. fund managers have never been
able to trade directly in an overseers order book before, without having to pay a
broker to access it. Until now, that is. Tradepoint has a completely unique
offering, with no competitors to its services in the U.S.A., so strong demand is
expected from the U.S. buy-side and sell-side.
Tradepoint Financial Networks PLC (last modified June 15, 1999) <http://
www.tradepoint.co.uk/newsletapr99-3.html>. Tradepoint's management seems to
believe that U.S. managers will be more receptive to the electronic format than those in
Britain.
212. Id. Tradepoint's flexibility allowing "any customer demand for trading in euros
or other currencies" is an added attraction to U.S. institutions. Tradepoint Financial
Networks PLC (last modified June 15, 1999) <http://www.tradepoint.co.uk/
newsJaunched.html>.
213. See Tradepoint Financial Networks PLC (last modified June 15, 1999) <http://
www.tradepoint.co.uk/newslet-apr99_1.html>.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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Also contributing to Tradepoint's national growth prospects is the cho-
rus of criticism the LSE has received for its perceived "overbearing man-
ner."2 17 Because of this discontent, many brokers are "considerling]
routing their business through Tradepoint."2 18 While the LSE seeks to
fight off any opposition and engages in new arrangements such as that
with the German exchange in order to strengthen its European and world-
wide presence, 2 19 the alternative Tradepoint presents could prove appeal-
ing, especially in light of its recent financial boost. Its presence has already
been considered partly responsible for the LSE's establishment of SETS in
the first place and currently, the LSE has entirely moved to an electronic
system.2
20
In an attempt to address the possible growth of Tradepoint, the SEC
has conditioned "[Tradepoint's] operation in the United States upon it
remaining a low volume exchange in the U.K."2 2 1 Such a condition
achieves little in terms of precedential value and in the fostering of positive
growth of the firm. With Tradepoint's management continually seeking
profits and looking for new opportunities in the international equity mar-
kets, remaining a limited volume exchange may not always be a reality or a
desired course and should not be a term to its U.S. existence. 22 2 And even
if Tradepoint specifically never succeeds on a larger scale, the possibility of
another entity doing so is certainly not inconceivable.
Dismissing concerns regarding investor protection, 223 one commenta-
tor has pointed out that U.S. investors already directly trade on foreign
exchanges by means of electronic brokerage systems and London-based
affiliates. 224 These brokerage systems have received less public attention
217. See London Stock Exchange, Dancing to a New Tune, supra note 201, at 24.
218. Id. Though not necessarily a direct correlation, Tradepoint has reported "solid
growth" in its order book volumes as of the end of November, 1998. Tradepoint's Trou-
bles Grow, supra note 189, at 34.
219. The alliance between the LSE and Frankfurt seeks to "develop a common plat-
form to combine the trading of stocks." London Stock Exchange, Dancing to a New Tune,
supra note 201, at 24.
220. See Glasgow, supra note 159, at 58; see also Siegel, supra note 70, at A34.
221. SEC Release No. 34-40161, supra note 29, at 37149.
222. See Unaudited Results, supra note 189, for Peter R. Stevens' (chairman of Trade-
point) outline of the company's "Building and Developing" plans, as well as for his
description of the company "Outlook." ("The international equity markets are changing
at an unprecedented rate. We are confident that your company is well positioned both
to respond to and take advantage of these changes.").
223. See Kentouris, supra note 22, at 21. The NYSE recently complained that
[t]here is no basis to grant Tradepoint's exemption request without requiring it
to provide U.S. investors with full-sale and quotation information as mandated
for all other public markets trading registered equity securities .... To allow
otherwise will permit those market players that have accesses to Tradepoint data
to have significant informational advantage over other investors, raising serious
investor protection concerns.
Id. (emphasis added).
224. See Letter from Steil, supra note 87, at 2. See also Kentouris, supra note 22, at 21.
However, the "larger buy-side players, which Tradepoint targets, typically prefer to deal
directly with an exchange." Id. See also London Stock Exchange, Dancing to a New Tune,
supra note 201, at 24, discussing how Tradepoint "focus[es] on large trades for institu-
tional investors." At present, Instinet is an example of an instrument which provides
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than Tradepoint, yet they provide similar services.22 5 Therefore, one may
seriously question whether the SEC's continuous protection-related con-
cerns are well-founded.
Even if the Commission were to revise existing exchange requirements
as Bloomberg and others have suggested, regulation of ATSs as exchanges
is rife with shortcomings and obstacles. Not only does it fail to allow
investors to take advantage of the strengths of these electronic trading sys-
tems (such as efficiency, lesser costs, etc.), it will inhibit further growth.226
While Tradepoint should operate under a Section 5 exemption so that it can
operate in the United States,227 this should not be considered an accepta-
ble regulatory scheme. It can only serve as a temporary solution.
B. Registration as a BD: Not a Solution
Applying a BD classification to Tradepoint also would have been an awk-
ward fit. It would have involved applying an artificial label to the system, it
would have demanded the ATS to fulfill requirements inapplicable to the
services it provides, and it would have failed to address the aspects and
functions of Tradepoint which do require regulation.2 28 While the SEC
believes it can "permit broker-dealer access providers to provide both retail
and sophisticated investors with electronic links to foreign markets, and to
provide such links to foreign markets that trade U.S. and foreign securi-
ties,"229 attempting to apply the traditional BD label to Tradepoint would
not have been ideal.
Although the filing amendments discussed in Part II.B. of this Note
might ease the registration process, there are other attendant problems.
Bloomberg has commented that registration of ATSs as BDs "could severely
alter, and perhaps even eliminate, the role of ATSs in the marketplace." 0
Bloomberg also suggested that BD classification "could create a central
market system that controls all order flow and distributes executions, not
orders, to ATSs."23 1 This consolidation to a central market should be
feared, according to Bloomberg, because "[tiaken to its logical and practical
conclusion, such centralization of the market could severely truncate, if not
direct access to markets electronically. Instinet has allowed market makers to "quote
prices better than those made available to public investors." SEC Release No. 34-40760,
supra note 13, at 70845. For this reason, the SEC is wary of the impact Instinet and
other systems can have on the market. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49.
225. See Letter from Steil, supra note 87, at 2.
226. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49 (discussing the hindering of Tradepoint's
growth).
227. Anthony Neuberger argues that Tradepoint should be welcomed into the U.S.
system because it provides investors with a "widening in choice of trading strategy." See
Letter from Neuberger, supra note 70, at 1.
228. See Domowitz, supra note 8, at 98.
229. See SEC Release No. 34-38672, supra note 45, at 30487, for discussion of "Alter-
natives for Revising Regulation Applicable to Foreign Market Activities in the United
States."
230. Mark Hendrickson, Automated Trading & Straight-Through Processing: Bloomberg
Slams SEC ATS Proposals as 'Unworkable,' SEcs. INDusTRY NEws, AEiamcAN BANKER, INC.,
Sept. 14, 1998, at 9.
231. Id.
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eliminate, the role of ATSs and stifle competition, restricting investors'
opportunities."232 This concern mirrors the one previously voiced in the
discussion of exchange classification in that the coordination requirement
imposed upon exchanges could eliminate the benefits of ATSs and thereby
threaten their continuation. 233
Not only could classifying ATSs as BDs hinder progress in the elec-
tronic market arena, but this classification is insufficient in what it does
mandate. Currently, BD requirements do not touch upon "system access
criteria, terms of trade execution, or the handling of quotations. 234 These
are three areas applicable to the surveillance of ATSs, yet they remain
unmonitored in the BD regulatory framework. Therefore, if the SEC had
provided foreign ATSs with the similar option between BD and exchange
status that the Commission has afforded to domestic electronic exchanges
in the past, the SEC would once again have failed to adequately address the
aspects of ATSs which require monitoring and would have continued to
impose needless restrictions.
C. Functional Approaches: Not a Solution
The functional approach the SEC has adopted with respect to domestic
ATSs also would have failed as a viable solution. Although proponents of
functional classification believe that it would promote innovation and
growth since the ATS is not confined by the approved list of activities that
BD or exchange registration would permit, it does require new filings every
time an ATS expands its breadth of services thus adding to administrative
obligations.
The arguments that defenders of the purely functional method 235 cite
are all compelling. Fairness, flexibility, and the reduction of the haphazard
nature of regulation are attractive benefits of the purely functional
approach. Providing an arena conducive to the promotion of innovation is
a goal of the SEC. 23 6 As the Commission recently stated in its Release
pertaining to regulation of ATSs dealing in domestic securities (codifying
the use of function and volume as the standards by which to determine
whether an entity should be deemed a BD or an exchange), it wishes to
cultivate "innovative new markets. '237 Nonetheless, the Commission
could achieve the same benefits from a clearer method.
While supporters of the purely functional approach feel it is quite
straightforward in its simplicity - if one performs an activity, that activity
must be regulated - some vagueness exists. What level of activity does
one have to perform to trigger regulation? Would an ATS which, as a cour-
tesy to its members, provides a service in its most limited extent still have
232. Id.
233. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49.
234. Domowitz, supra note 8, at 98.
235. See supra Part II.C.
236. See supra notes 46 and 63 regarding the SEC's goals and its forward looking
concerns.
237. SEC Release No. 34-40760, supra note 13, at 70845.
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to make filings with the SEC regarding the activity?238 What type of
administrative burden would that impose on the firm's compliance obliga-
tions? Finally, for a system like Tradepoint, how would the SEC factor in
the foreign securities element? Trading in international markets might
need to be a separately regulated activity, and since there is no set standard
at present, other than Tradepoint's recent Section 5 exemption, the SEC
would have to determine a procedure for regulating that function. This
form of regulation, in addition to the vagueness problems discussed earlier
in the Note, can be a large administrative burden. And the revised func-
tional approach that the SEC has set for domestic ATSs suffers from the
same inadequacies from which BD and exchange classifications separately
suffer.
D. Access Provider Regulatory Classification: The Solution
The Commission should establish a new access provider regulatory classi-
fication and should regulate Tradepoint as such. The Commission can
structure this new category to address the unique characteristics of foreign
ATSs, eliminate superfluous registration requirements, and provide a more
hands-off regulatory policy. The benefit of a new access provider classifi-
cation would mainly lie in its simplicity and freedom from extensive regu-
latory burdens. Because these access providers are simply links within the
securities market system, checks and supervisory protections are already in
place. Adding extensive regulation of the middle-man achieves nothing,
weighs down the system, and basically eliminates the advantages of an elec-
tronic intermediary.
This new classification would require an ATS to: (1) provide terms of
execution,2 39 (2) ensure that non-U.S. orders do not receive precedence
and that response time to U.S. and non-U.S. orders is equal,240 (3) provide
information about the handling of quotes,24 1 (4) furnish basic information
regarding the company and its management, (5) file quarterly financial
statements, 2 42 and (6) agree to provide all new members with a written
explanation of the risks involved in trading foreign securities.
238. For example, if a large shopping store were to be regulated by an agency it would
have to have its sales monitored. If the store had a cafE, it would be wise to regulate the
kitchen and survey the food that the caf& dispenses. If the store had a playroom for
children, for safety reasons it would probably be wise to make certain that the children
were properly supervised. But, should the store have to fill out the same paperwork that
a full-service child day care facility would? And what if the store did not have a caf6 but
rather had vending machines in the basement for its workers? Would that store have to
comply with the same filing requirements as a cafA? Or how about a change machine
located beside the vending machine - would the store then have to fill out paperwork
for performing currency exchange services?
239. See supra note 228 regarding areas of ATSs which require supervision.
240. See SEC Release No. 34-40161, supra note 29, at 37150, for discussion of the
need to ensure equivalent responses time for orders placed by U.S. and foreign investors.
This form of equity is important in assuring that American investors are not only pro-
tected, but that they have a fair shot at succeeding in this market.
241. See id.
242. See id. This quarterly information would include: "total volume and average
daily volume of transactions effected through the system during the period and year-to-
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This laissez-faire methodology is desirable because the electronic
nature of ATSs provides a high degree of surveillance. 243 Systems like
Tradepoint provide "less opportunity for fraud or manipulation to
occur."24 4 Because they are computer linked, "a perfect audit trail" is avail-
able "if manipulation nevertheless is suspected. '245 This feature is crucial,
as one of the SEC's tasks is to protect against such manipulation of the
market.246 The technologically advanced systems, such as Tradepoint,
allow surveillance "by supplying regulatory organizations with access to
the alternative trading system's computer facility" making surveillance eas-
ier and thereby lessening the need for additional regulation.247 This is a
key argument in proposing a more arms-length regulatory relationship
between the SEC and Tradepoint-like entities.
A hands-off regulatory policy is also attractive because lessening
bureaucratic requirements will allow the SEC to encourage innovation.
Market participants are likely to recognize change and improvement in
trading systems if the SEC removes some of its regulatory restraints. The
access-provider classification will open the door to new competitors as par-
ticipants will no longer be banned from U.S. entry, nor deterred from oper-
ating by exhaustive SEC requirements. This competition will help regulate
ATSs as market forces will effectually guide them.
Additionally, an access provider classification can furnish a degree of
regulatory flexibility not associated with any other type of classification.
As opposed to traditional BD and exchange registration, an access-provider
category would be most able to adapt to future changes. Presently, there is
a high level of uncertainty as to what financial instruments and trading
mediums will develop in the next century. Drastic changes are already
occurring at a spiraling rate as the stock market that we have come to know
no longer looks familiar.248 The surge in after-hours trading is evidence of
the rapid trend away from the traditional stock market system.
date aggregates of these numbers, expressed in (a) number of units of securities... ; (b)
number of transactions; and (c) monetary volume.. . ." Id.
243. See Blanc, supra note 32, at 33. Blanc addresses surveillance issues in his discus-
sion of "Proposed Regulation of ATSs as Exchanges."
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See supra note 68 regarding the SEC's Congressionally established
responsibilities.
247. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49. According to Macey and O'Hara,
as technology improves, so, too, will monitoring capabilities. Currently, all
transactions executed in the over-the-counter markets must be reported through
the NASD's transaction reporting system, thus creating in the over-the-counter
markets an audit trail of the same quality as the NYSE is able to produce. The
proposed OATS system which would monitor orders from submission to execu-
tion (or cancellation) ultimately would improve dramatically the market's moni-
toring capabilities. While these developments may be good for market
participants, they have hurt the NYSE by eliminating the NYSE's historic
"franchise" in the field of monitoring services.
Id.
248. One example of change is the fact that as ofJanuary 25, 1999, "roughly 5 million
amateur investors ... do their occasional trading on the Internet . . . ." Day Traders
Under Close Eye of Regulators Series: Money Monday, FLA. TODAY, Jan. 25, 1999, at 02E.
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Until recently, only large sized investors have had their own after-
hours market.24 9 When the 4 p.m. New York Stock Exchange and NAS-
DAQ bells struck on Wall Street or 4:30 p.m. tolled on regional exchanges,
these institutional entities could continue trading.250 Instead of placing an
order to be executed the following business day as was always done,25 '
these groups could trade shares among themselves. This was achieved den-
erally through ATSs such as Reuters Group's Instinet Corp.25 2 Extended
trading has proved to be a crucial new venue for large investors since news
from West Coast companies, such as Intel, often is disseminated publicly
only after 4 p.m. EST.25 3 Small investors could not participate in such a
market. Therefore, these small groups and individuals were deprived of the
opportunity to monopolize on information dispensed post-closing,254 plac-
ing them at a severe disadvantage.
Yet, this slanted playing field is changing. In August 1999, the Chi-
cago Stock Exchange "approved a plan to offer after-hours trading to insti-
tutions and individuals, starting in October" 1999.255 This is the first such
move by a traditional exchange. Alternatively, "E*Trade made a deal with
Instinet," that had already been involved in after-hours trading,256 "to allow
customers to trade stocks until 6:30p.m. Eastern time, away from tradi-
tional exchanges."257 Most recently, REDI Book, another ECN, announced
plans of a deal involving Archipelago Holdings, Island Trading, and
MarketXT, in which it will "be linked" to these other ECNs "for distribution
of after-hours prices and orders" as "[it] will consolidate pricing data for
these venues." 25 8 From a regulatory perspective, the idea of opening the
249. Big-time investors, such as institutions, execute post-closing trades among them-
selves through the use of electronic trading systems. See Online Firms Want to Trade
Stocks Around the Clock: the surge in individual investors and frequent trading helps fuel the
after-hours trend, BLOOMBERG NEws, OMAiA WoRLD-HERALD, Feb. 8, 1999, at 12 [herein-
after Online Firms].
250. See Greg Ip, Soon, Online Investors May be 'All-Day' Traders, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
1999, at Cl.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See Online Firms, supra note 249, at 12. "An after-hours market would help indi-
vidual investors trade on news that breaks after the stock market doses. Many compa-
nies such as Intel Corp. release earnings after the market doses at 4 p.m. New York
time." Id.
254. Because of this disadvantage, online investors who wanted to buy after 4 p.m. are
able only to place their orders with online brokers such as Charles Schwab Corp. and
E*Trade Group Inc. In turn, the orders are executed only "at the next day's opening -
one of the causes of the burst of activity that occurs then." Ip, supra note 250, at Cl.
255. Robin Goldwyn Blumenthal, ed., Reviews and Previews: Trading, BamRo's, Aug.
23, 1999 at 12 (emphasis added). See also Extension of NASDAQ Trade Reporting and
Quote Dissemination Systems Also Approved (Oct. 14, 1999) <http://www.sec.gov/news/
chxhars.html> (announcing the SECs approval of "two pilot programs that would allow
after-hours trading by the Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX) and extend the NASDAQ
Stock Markets (NASDAQ) trade reporting and quote dissemination systems").
256. Ip, supra note 250, at C1.
257. Blumenthal, supra note 255, at 12.
258. REDI Book ECN Announces After-Hours Links, Buy-Side Connections, PRNew-
swire (Feb. 3, 2000) <http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/ ... Y=www/stay/02-03-
2000/0001132041. REDI Book executes an average of 70 million shares a day. See id.
Cornell International Law Journal
after-hours market to individual or "retail" investors is a major step.
Foremost are protection issues akin to those discussed regarding
domestic ATSs and Tradepoint. 25 9 Additionally, there is apprehension
regarding the possibly low level of liquidity by which this market will be
characterized if professionals choose to not participate in it.260 It is true
that order-flow is crucial towards the success of systems such as Wit Capi-
tal (the world's first on-line investment banking firm).261 Without enough
participants, there cannot be a liquid market. One observer stated that
"commitments from three of the top five on-line brokers" would be neces-
sary "to make this thing... work."262
While liquidity is an ever present concern, it may not prove to be prob-
lematic in the least for groups such as Wit.26 3 There seems to be an
increasing interest involving participation in after-hours trading specifi-
cally and on-line trading264 generally. More and more retail investors are
transacting trades through the Internet daily.26 5 Though MarketXT says
259. "John Markese, president of the Chicago-based American Association of Individ-
ual Investors, said individuals may be trading without advantages that some big inves-
tors may have, such as company conference calls. 'After hours, who gets the information
first? My guess is it's still institutions.'" See Ip, supra note 250, at Cl.
260. See id. The greater the number of system participants, the greater the liquidity of
the market. While it has been argued that liquidity does not necessarily equal stability
(see note 78 for Benn Steil's argument regarding the relationship between liquidity and
safety), many believe a wider pool of investors will help toward the success of Wit.
261. See Welcome to Wit Capital <http://www.witcapital.com/company/
comp.toc.jsp>.
262. Online Firms, supra note 249, at 12 (quoting Bill Burnham, "who follows on-line
companies for Credit Suisse First Boston Corp.").
263. See id. This is due to the increasing interest in trading online and even after-
hours.
264. See supra text accompanying note 259 ("A study by Burnham found that on-line
stock trading rose 122 percent in the fourth quarter of 1998 from the same period a year
earlier. One in seven trades took place over the Web in the 1998 quarter, he said."). Id.
See also Ip, supra note 250, at Cl: "After-hours trading seems a natural service to offer
to the mushrooming population of online investors who often buy and sell a stock in as
little as a day (a practice called day trading)." Id.
265. About 15 percent of the securities brokerage commissions generated last
year resulted from discount brokerage transactions. Increasingly, this business
has gone online. And a number of financial service companies operating here
have sought to capitalize on the trend. A Credit Suisse First Boston report said
222,000 securities trades per day were executed during the second quarter of
[1998] by about 80 'online broker' computer stock-trading services, such as
ETrade, Accutrade, Ameritrade and Datek Online. Volume soared from 117,600
trades in 1997 second quarter, on the strength of general stock market activity
and because 'new customers have continued to stream into the industry,' said
Bill Burnham, who prepared the report. Contributing to the trend are Internet
growth and the fact that 'employers are essentially forcing their employees to
become self-directed investors,' he said. In the past, many corporations offered
defined benefit pension plans, guaranteed monthly payments based on salary
and years of service. But today, most firms have shifted to defined contribution
plans, such as 401(k) plans, which depend on employees to decide how much to
invest and where to put their money, he said.
Doug LeDuc, More U.S. Amateur Investors Trade Stocks Over Internet, KNIGHT-RIDDER
TRiB. Bus. NEws, Sept. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16338550.
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"research shows that many online investors are interested,"266 the organiza-
tion does believe that its plan to restrict their potential market to only
"'limit' orders, which can be executed only within prescribed price lim-
its" 2 6 7 will "address the unique risks of trading after hours."268
Fundamentally, the very concept of on-line investing has raised vari-
ous concerns. The volume of online investments is no longer immaterial.
Charles Schwab, "the country's largest cyber-trading firm" was recorded to
place "an average 153,000 trades a day on its Web site in January [1999] a
65% increase over its average daily trading volume of 93,000 in the fourth
quarter"269 in 1998. In fact, Schwab handled in excess of "1 million online
orders" in the week of January 11, 1999 alone, and reached a staggering
level of customer trades totaling "$2.6 billion worth of securities online
each day duringJanuary [1999]"270 and has maintained this pace.27 1 The
first month of 1999 witnessed a surge of online trading across the board,
not only for Schwab, and as of September 1999, ECNs accounted for
approximately 300% of NASDAQ's trading volume.272 Certainly, such a
high degree of securities activity cannot go without notice, especially from
a regulatory perspective.
Issues of fraud rank high on the list of fears by investors. In late Octo-
ber of 1998, the SEC announced its "first ever Internet investment fraud
sweep." 273 This was no inconsequential matter. As part of this sweep, the
SEC "open[ed] ... cases against 44 individuals and companies in 23 sepa-
rate actions through the U.S."274 The charges brought against these groups
involved "illegally pumping stocks and then taking big compensation and
selling off their shares, causing the stock prices to plunge and leaving other
266. Ip, supra note 250, at C1. At the time of this comment, the company was called
Eclipse Trading. Since that time, it has renamed itself MarketXT. Citigroup Unit Will
Offer After-Hours Stock Trading, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1999, at C15. On February 10,
2000, Tradescape.com Inc. announced its purchase of MarketXT for $100 million in
private stock. Tradescape.com plans on increasing the ECN's trading hours and hope-
fully making the system more competitive with systems such as Charles Schwab Corp.
Greg Ip, Deals & Deal Makers: Tradescape.com to Acquire Market XT for Private Stock
Valued at $100 Million, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2000, at C22.
267. Id.
268. A potential result of an unlimited market is that "an investor.., can end up
paying more or getting far less than expected for a stock." Id.
269. Amy Feldman, Schwab Web Trades Soar, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Feb. 17, 1999, at 29.
270. Id. Michael Schroeder & Greg Ip, Levitt Urges Central Market to Price Stocks,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1999, at C1 (describing that while 30% of NASDAQ's trading
volume has been taken by ECNs, "an insignificant share of Big Board trading" is exe-
cuted by these entities "because of rules limiting trading Big Board away from a 'stock
exchange'").
271. See Online Trading Hits Snag at Schwab: Computer Problem Shut Down System for
an Hour, KANs/crry STA, Aug. 31, 1999, at D34 (stating that as of August 1999, Schwab
was handling approximately "147,700 online trades a day for its 6.2 million active inves-
tor accounts").
272. See id.
273. Robert MacMillan, NASAA Accidently Spams Tipsters, NwsBY-r.s Nws NErwoRK,
Oct. 30, 1998, at 1998 WL 20718237.
274. Id.
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investors out in the cold." 275 Commencing these actions sent a clear signal
to online entities that an unruly Wild-West atmosphere will not be toler-
ated on the Internet trading scene. Securities fraud and investor manipula-
tion are still enforceable actions, even on this new medium.
Another investor concern is "system failure" - when the system is not
accessible, or "down" due to technical problems, thereby preventing inves-
tors from executing trades. For example, "online securities brokerage
E*Trade276 experienced a series of very public system failures caused by a
software change. These failures prevented customers from making trades
and checking their account balances." 277 This malfunction 278 was more
than a mere annoyance. Not only did this frustrate E*Trade's custom-
ers,279 and anger securities regulators, 280 it also "prompted an investiga-
tion by the New York Attorney General into the practice of online
trading."281 This is because the repercussions of system failure are many.
What happens if an investor puts in a buy or sell order only to find out
then that the system crashed moments after? What happened to the trade?
More importantly, what about the great loss one could have avoided or
gain that one could have realized if the trade had been properly executed?
Does an investor simply accept that risk by engaging in on-line trading or
should he or she expect the same level of execution as if the trade were
placed with a trdaditional brokerage house?
How does this apply to Tradepoint? What does after-hours trading
275. Id.
276. E*Trade is the second ranked "online trading shop." Charles Schwab is the
number one online firm. On February 16, 1999, E*Trade announced that "it got
approval from securities regulators to begin selling mutual funds and money market
accounts over the Internet." Feldman, supra note 269, at 29.
277. Stephanie Stahl, Cutting-Edge IT Can't Guarantee Perfection, INFORMATIONwEEK,
Feb. 8, 1999, at 181 ("Those few hours of instability were enough to enrage many cus-
tomers and cast doubt on E*Trade's ability to handle spikes in transactions.").
278. The malfunction involved a 90 minute crash on February 3, 1999 and a two
hour gap on the following day. Net Consumers Face a Virtual Standstill (E'Trade Securi-
ties Online Outage), SAN JosE MERCURY NEws, Feb. 5, 1999, at 1A(2) (stating that "indus-
try analysts believe that companies like E*Trade must anticipate the worst-case scenario
and have a contingency plan in place").
279. One explanation for problems in online trading is that "the incredible pace of
change in markets, business, and technology, combined with technical complexity, often
make all of this difficult to manage. E*Trade's problems are proof that even the most
prepared and cutting-edge companies are susceptible to the vagaries of the unknown."
Stahl, supra note 277, at 181.
280. See E*Trade Delays Spark Inquiry (The Online Securities Trader's System
Problems), PC WEEK, Feb. 8, 1999, at 1999 WL 9711389, (discussing how "[a] series of
network failures... put E*Trade, the online stock trading company, in hot water with
both users and securities regulators").
281. Stahl, supra note 277, at 181. New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer addressed
the complaints of online investors by "probing online trading firms this month." Feld-
man, supra note 269, at 29. See also E*Trade Delays Spark Inquiry, supra note 280, at
1999 WL 9711389 (discussing that "New York officials said they were going to take a
hard look at the online stock trading industry after three days' worth of problems pre-
vented online traders from conducting transactions through the E*Trade Web site.").
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and the expansion of on-line investing282 mean to this British ATS and the
SEC's foreign ATS regulatory scheme? Conventional methods of SEC clas-
sification will not smoothly apply to Wit, MarketXT, and other future mar-
ket systems. The extensive administrative burdens and strict limitations as
to what falls within the established categories cannot properly address
these new technologies.
We are clearly moving toward a world with twenty-four hour global
trading for institutional and retail investors alike. This progress should not
automatically be curtailed by excessive regulation or adhesion to archaic
classification rules. While we continually hear the echos of protection con-
cerns, if the SEC were to permit domestic ATSs such as Instinet and Datek
to expand their services to retail investors online, protection issues may be
less of a concern to the SEC. While Tradepoint deals solely with institu-
tional investors, Instinet and Datek would enjoy much greater breadth
operating in the retail investor element. Certainly, the protection issues
involved in retail sales is much greater than those which Tradepoint
triggers.
Moreover, the fact that Tradepoint is foreign does not obfuscate the
issue. The risk to U.S. retail investors dealing in U.S. securities via Wit as
opposed to investors accessing U.K. securities through Tradepoint is insub-
stantial. U.S. investors are already indirectly dealing in foreign securities.
In fact, trading on Wit or its equivalent can be even riskier than trading on
the Tradepoint system. This is because Tradepoint requires membership.
Presumably, its members are familiar with trading risks, unlike many who
trade over the Internet, unaware of the dangers involved.28 3
Only an access provider classification can adapt to these moderniza-
tions. A less rigid and non-traditional format can be flexible enough to
accommodate innovative new domestic and foreign systems 2 84 while still
282. Predictions as to the growth of on-line investing are universal. "A survey last
year by Jupiter Communications, for example, forecasts that discount brokerages would
control more than 50 percent of personal finance activity online by 2002 and that online
trading would be carried out by 31 percent of the entire investing market. In addition,
the investment bank Piper Jaffray, a leading industry tracker, predicted that online trad-
ing volumes would amount to more than 27 percent of all retail trades by the end of
1998, compared with 17 percent in 1997. Piper Jaffray also reported that the top ten
online brokerages had 5.8 million accounts between them at September 1998, more than
double the figure of one year earlier." The Widening Web (Part I of 2), FuNos Irr'L., Feb.
1, 1999, at 8.
283. One commentator remarked that ... it raises concerns that online trading,
risky enough for unsophisticated individuals, could be riskier still in the relatively
murky, lightly traveled after-hours market." Ip, supra note 250, at Cl. In addition, most
every-day investors probably won't be looking to invest heavily in British stocks.
284. In addition to the on-line systems already discussed, other new formats are now
being suggested. For *example, W-Trade, GTE Financial Services Group and Reality
Online are "offering systems that allow their brokerage clients' retail customers to trade
securities via cellular phones and other portable handheld devices." Edward Kountz,
Reality Online Unveils Wireless Net Trading System, SEcs. hNDusTRv NEws, Oct. 19, 1998,
at 17 [hereinafter Kountz 1]; Edward Kountz, First Wireless Options Trading System on
Deck, SEcs. INous'RY NEws, Sept. 21, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Kountz 2]; Edward Kountz,
GTE Gets Unwired, Too; Launches Wireless Trading System, SEcs. INDusTRY NEws, Oct. 5,
1998, at 11 [hereinafter Kountz 3].
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providing a basic supervisory structure. Supervision is still a forefront
concern. While the SEC has an obligation to deter fraud and manipula-
tion 285 of electronic markets, it also has an obligation to foster a reason-
ably level playing field. The ways to achieve fairness are guaranteeing
equal response time and immediate re-routing of orders. Surveillance of
these factors should be a primary task of the SEC. Current SEC regula-
tions do not address such issues and these matters are but minor reflec-
tions of what might be to come.
IV. The Impact the SEC's Decision Regarding Tradepoint Will Have
on the U.S. Market and Future Regulation
The Commission's recent decision regarding Tradepoint has the potential
to contribute to a possible proliferation of similar exchanges. The SEC
could apply a similar standard as the one it has applied to Tradepoint if it
finds that a new entity is organized so as to comply with the rules and
regulations applicable to it and to provide a fair and protective environment
for investors. 286 Since access to the U.S. market creates a solid opportunity
for smaller exchanges, there is a strong possibility that if the Commission
were to expand its application of such a means of registration, there could
be a rise in applicants. If the SEC were to use the low-volume exemption as
a standard for entities analogous to Tradepoint, without expressly limiting
its breadth, it would most assuredly be promoting the establishment of
W-Trade's Wireless Internet Trading System, the industry's first wireless trading
system, used by InvesTrade, employs AT&T's Pocket Net Wireless service to
deliver its Internet trading capability via Palmpiots, smart cellular phones and
other devices .... Customer trades go through W-Trade's computer servers,
from where they are routed to InvestTrade's trading system and, eventually, to
InvestTrade's clearing agent, the BHC Securities unit of Fiserv.
Kountz 2, supra, at 1. GTE, which "unveiled what observers say is the securities indus-
try's second wireless Internet-based trading system," "builds on GTE's previous wireless
experience, including development of wireless trading technology now in use on the
floor of the New York Stock Exchange .... ." Kountz 3, supra, at 11. "Like W-Trade's
creation, GTE's Wireless Trader allows retail clients of the e-brokerage community to
trade, receive alerts and tap stock quotes via portable cellular phones called 'smart'
phones." Kountz 3, supra, at 11. Reality, combines with "wireless computing mid-
dieware developed by Aether Technologies." "The Reality/Aether wireless system allows
investors to enter and execute orders, retrieve real-time quotes and news and query their
account data via hand-held computers, digital assistants and so-called smart phones."
Kountz 1, supra, at 17.
285. In an effort to respond to what the Securities and Exchange Commission has
identified as an increase in fraud concerning online investing, the Commission "has
created the Office of Internet Enforcement." Internet Enforcement, FLOIDA TODAY, July
29, 1998, at 10C. Provisions such as these are positive steps in the SEC's move to adapt
to the changing needs of the securities industry. The Office of Internet Enforcement will
enable the SEC to address the specific and unique issues of the Internet while maintain-
ing its broader goal of investor protection.
286. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(d) (1999).
If it appears to the Commission that the exchange applying for registration is so
organized as to be able to comply with the provisions of this title and the rules
and regulations thereunder and that the rules of the exchange are just and ade-
quate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors, the Commission shall cause
such exchange to be registered as a national securities exchange.
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numerous small exchanges. Such ATSs would spring-up in small form in
order to take advantage of the low-volume exemption rather than forming
based on need or demand.28 7 Though competition often positively stimu-
lates improvements,2 88 this overflow risks compromising overall efficiency.
Regardless of the means of regulation, Tradepoint will certainly not be
the last foreign ATS to attempt U.S. registration. With the need for a physi-
cal trading floor no longer necessary and computers providing the basic
link between systems' participants, location is not an impediment to global
growth. The historic barriers to expansion are disappearing.
The Tradepoint decision may also have a profound effect on the U.S.
securities market. The SEC has continually expressed its concern regarding
the inferior dissemination of information the foreign firms and markets
provide28 9 and direct U.S. investor access hits this issue squarely. The
Commission has also conveyed its concern that trading systems "have no
obligation to provide investors a fair opportunity to participate in their sys-
tems or to treat their participants fairly."290 Yet, these concerns were
voiced regarding domestic ATSs, and as evidenced by the Commission's
concept release regarding the regulation of ATSs, it would appear that the
287. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 49. Macey and O'Hara commented that "special
exemptive treatment for alternative trading mechanisms that are of low volume" would
be illogical as it "would simply allow competitors to avoid burdensome regulation by
remaining small. The sheer number of alternative trading systems would proliferate..."
for non-demand related reasons. Id.
288. The theory that monopolies deter innovation is a common one. See Scott
McNealy, What Constitutes a Monopoly? Software Serenade Before the Courts, WASH.
TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1999, at B3 (discussing the Microsoft suit, stating that "[a]s history
shows, when the government has moved against monopolies, innovation and competi-
tion have flourished.") See also Andrew J. Glass, Economist Says Microsoft is Guilty,
ATLANTA CoNsT., Jan. 6, 1999, at Dl (quoting Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Professor Franklin Fisher's comment regarding the Microsoft situation: "If software
developers believe that Microsoft will engage in anti-competitive acts to impede any
innovation that threatens its monopoly, they will have substantially reduced incentives
to innovate in competition with Microsoft.") For a more relevant example of this
monopoly concern, Bloomberg suggested that "[i]f the Commission were to adopt its
proposal to establish NASDAQ as the market center and sole source of executions, the
chances of NASDAQ voluntarily upgrading its technology in the future become slim."
Letter from Bloomberg, supra note 28, at 7. This is usually true since there is no incen-
tive to improve one's capabilities when there is no competitor lurking around the corner,
looking to take away one's market share. Of course, there are exceptions to the rule.
Take for instance, "government-granted monopolies (patents)" that "spur innovation" in
the prescription drug industry. This does not "interfere with the free market" according
to this article's authors, due to the fact that there is no free market for prescription
drugs. Alan Sager & Deborah Socolar, A Fairer Prescription Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
26, 1999, at A19.
289. See SEC Release No. 34-40760, supra note 13, at 70846. In order to achieve the
"benefits of both market centralization - deep, liquid markets - and competition" the
national market system "has maintained equally regulated, individual markets, which
are linked together to make their best prices publicly known and accessible." However,
because "[alternative trading systems have remained largely outside the national market
system," the SEC is concerned about the lack of duty the ATSs owe to their investors. Id.
at 70845. This Release discusses the system's lack of obligation to provide fairness to
investors as well as their vulnerability to manipulation and fraud.
290. Id.
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SEC has overcome these matters. Nevertheless, the above concerns can
easily be addressed under an access provider regulatory system.
The more important concern still outstanding is the ramifications
Tradepoint will have on the market in its entirety. Trading in foreign secur-
ities is accompanied by a certain degree of risk, as is trading in domestic
securities. There are various uncertainties since political and legal changes
within a country have a significant impact on the market.291 If U.S. inves-
tors are to trade heavily in a country's stock and that country is to then
undergo a turbulent event, it is inevitable that there would be a ripple
effect. However, U.S. investors are already executing trades in foreign
securities indirectly. While investors should only do so fully aware of the
risk factors, it would not appear that merely eliminating the middleman
would create any drastic results. Clearly, the SEC has recognized this by
allowing Tradepoint to win the Application process and continuing to mon-
itor the company's progress.
There is evidence that direct trading would have a minimal impact on
the U.S. market. One reason for this is the anonymity trades executed on
the system enjoy. Because "[birokers and other traders cannot ... draw
conclusions as to the dealing intentions or positions of trading parties,"
and because they are unaware of the parties' identities, they are prevented
from "act[ingl speculatively on them,"292 thus lessening the market impact.
This is crucial since many continue to fear the volatile nature of foreign
market trading and are apprehensive that the riskiness of these trades will
disturb the stability of the U.S. market.293 By maintaining anonymity,
291. The last major reform of the London Stock Exchange, commonly referred to as
the "Big Bang," took place on October 27, 1986. It was on this day that a formal agree-
ment was made regarding the reformation of the Exchange. The reforms mainly cen-
tered around negotiated rates by class of security, commissions, and discount rates.
Cecil Parkinson, Trade Secretary, was the individual who sparked this movement when
he asked the LSE to prepare reform proposals in July of 1983. After much debate,
variations of the changes were put into place. See IAN M. KERR, BIG BAN.G 32-34 (1986).
292. Glasgow, supra note 159, at 58. This anonymity is a key element of the Trade-
point system.
293. One must remember that Tradepoint currently offers trading only in securities
listed on the London Stock Exchange, not in securities of other more unstable nations.
While there is most definitely risk involved in the trading of U.K. stocks, the relative
stability of the United Kingdom contributes to the lesser level of concern regarding tur-
bulent side effects of direct U.S. access to these securities. This is not to say, however,
that if a large increase in the investing of British stocks were to occur, and the United
Kingdom were to subsequently undergo a major crisis, that there would be no ripple
effect. The Asian crisis of 1998 is evidence of what can occur. "When Asian markets
slumped last year, most U.S. businesses denied it would have much of an impact on the
American economy. Only recently have we felt the extent to which Asian economic woes
affect us directly. Failure in one part of a system always exposes the levels of intercon-
nectedness that otherwise go unnoticed - we suddenly see how our fates are linked
together. We see how much we are participating with one another, sustaining one
another." JohnJ. Petersen, Margaret Wheatley, Myron Kellner-Rogers, Computers and the
Years 2000: What Will Happen?, Cu, REr, Jan. 1, 1999, at 3. Yet, if a slump in the U.K.
were to occur, and an impact in the United States were to be felt, the source of the impact
would not be Tradepoint. This is because the institutions that will trade on the system
already are trading these British securities, simply through an extra intermediary. Addi-
tionally, without grossly oversimplifying the situation, the Asian market crisis did not
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future expansion into markets such as Hong Kong's and possibly those of
other European countries could likewise have minimal repercussions.
Traders will still want to avoid unwise trades, and the ones that they do
execute will not have a magnified effect.
Systems such as Tradepoint also are impacting the best execution rule.
The obligation to obtain the best price for an order is a broader responsibil-
ity than in the past. One scenario exposes the dilemma these systems
present:
On 13 October 1998, at 11:39:08 am, ten thousand shares in Commercial
General Union (symbol CGU) were traded at a price of 960p on the London
Stock Exchange. At that exact time, there existed a firm sell order on the
order-book of the other stock exchange (Tradepoint) at a price of 951p, in
the same size - ten thousand shares. By dealing at 960p on the LSE instead
of dealing on the (9p better) Tradepoint price, the buyer in this instance paid
at least £852 too much.2 94
Apparently, similar instances are not hard to find.2 95 Therefore, it has
become evident that immediate execution is not always the most economi-
cally sound alternative for an investor. Rather, patience on a trade may
prove more fruitful.296 Clearly, these electronic systems are exposing the
flaws inherent in the best execution rule and demonstrating the need for
reform. With companies such as Tradepoint advocating their own propos-
als for the best execution rule,2 97 we Will certainly see impact in this regu-
latory area in the future.
Tradepoint's entrance into the United States might also impact the
SEC's approach to domestic ATSs. If a new, successful, and less cumber-
solely affect those trading Asian securities; but rather it was the economic crisis of the
entire region that consequently affected exports, markets, etc.
294. Tradepoint Financial Networks PLC (last modified June 15, 1999) <http://
www.tradepoint.co.uk/news_bestexec.html>.
295. See id. In a speech given at Columbia Law School on September 23, 1999,
Arthur Levitt ". . . expressed fears that technological developments may also lead to
market fragmentation so that investors are not sure they are getting the best price when
they buy and sell." Siegel, supra note 70, at A34.
296. See Tradepoint Financial Networks PLC, supra note 294.
297. Tradepoint's proposed solution for the best execution rule was:
When considering Best Execution, regulated entities should: have access to all
relevant publicly available information as well as taking reasonable care to
solicit private information from intermediaries, deal (or instruct their agents to
deal) in such a way as to gain the best advantage for their clients, consider the
commission costs, spread costs and market impact costs, consider the cost of
immediate execution relative to patient execution as well as the risks involved in
price movement, consider the existence or otherwise of conflicts of interest
when choosing agents, especially where the order concerned is not being exe-
cuted directly, through a public limit order system.
Id. Additionally,
Tradepoint proposes an analogous structure to the U.S.: an inter-market trading
system combined with a consolidated ticker. This would have a number of
highly beneficial effects: It would make compliance with the improved Best Exe-
cution rule, by brokers, much more straightforward; it would reduce the costs of
dealing to investors; and by encouraging the provision of liquidity, it would
improve the quality and liquidity of the UK equity market.
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some access provider classification were to be established for foreign ATSs,
applying it to domestic electronic systems would seem a natural progres-
sion. Freeing the systems from the current exchange/BD requirements may
be a desirable alternative, more so if Tradepoint's transition is smooth. The
Commission has noted its need "for a more forward-looking regulatory
approach "' 298 in relation to both domestic and foreign technological devel-
opments. Therefore, its adoption of analogous means of regulation for
these classes of ATSs makes sense, especially since the ultimate goal is to
provide for the protection of U.S. investors.
Creating a clear and consistent means of regulation would also be
advantageous to U.S. investors. Such a defined framework would promote
the growth of ATSs. No longer would systems be deterred from attempting
the possibly costly and uncertain application process to operate in the
United States. Instead, they would be able to confidently enter the process,
aware of what to expect. This will encourage better established systems to
apply and, if approved, provide additional opportunities for American
traders.
Conclusion
This Note examined the various regulatory procedures the SEC could have
applied to foreign and domestic ATSs in general and to Tradepoint specifi-
cally. It described the shortcomings of the various existing regulatory clas-
sifications when extended to ATSs, discussed additional means of
registration, and explained why Tradepoint's Application for a Section 5
exemption was correctly approved provided it remain only on a temporary
basis. Further, it presented a new, alternative means of registration for
Tradepoint and similar systems: the access provider classification.
This new designation would allow the SEC to maintain its supervisory
role over the foreign ATSs in the same way it oversees BDs and exchanges.
Yet, because it would exercise less control over an ATS, it could also allow
for progress. An access provider classification would continue to require
standard financial reporting, disclosure of basic information, and fair and
equitable treatment of investors, but would not shackle the electronic sys-
tem with outdated and unnecessary requirements. Additionally, an access
provider classification would not restrict the creative and innovative power
of these entities. The creation of a new regulatory classification would
require a substantial investment from the SEC now, but would ultimately
prove efficient, eliminating many future problems. The SEC could thereby
create a category flexible enough to accommodate future technological
advancements not presently existing, nor imaginable today. We must move
beyond the traditional requirements and historic classifications of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and broaden the assortment of opportuni-
ties available to U.S. investors.
Id.
298. SEC Press Release 97-43, supra note 133, at 1.
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